IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 81 



If it be remembered that every attribute is grounded on some fact or 

 phenomenon, either of outward sense or of inward consciousness, and that 

 to possess an attribute is another phrase for being the cause of, or forming 

 part of, the fact or phenomenon upon which the attribute is grounded ; we 

 may add one more step to complete the analysis. The proposition which 

 asserts that one attribute always accompanies another attribute, really as- 

 serts thereby no other thing than this, that one phenomenon always accom- 

 panies another phenomenon ; insomuch that where we find the latter, we 

 have assurance of the existence of the former. Thus, in the proposition. 

 All men are mortal, the word man connotes the attributes which we ascribe 

 to a certain kind of living creatures, on the ground of certain phenomena 

 which they exhibit, and which are partly physical phenomena, namely the 

 impressions made on our senses by their bodily form and structure, and 

 partly mental phenomena, namely the sentient and intellectual life which 

 they have of their own. All this is understood when we utter the word 

 man, by any one to whom the meaning of the word is known. Now, when 

 we say, Man is mortal, we mean that wherever these various physical and 

 mental phenomena are all found, there we have assurance that the other 

 physical and mental phenomenon, called death, will not fail to take place. 

 The proposition does not affirm when/ for the connotation of the word 

 mortal goes no further than to the occurrence of the phenomenon at some 

 time or other, leaving the particular time undecided. 



§ 5. We have already proceeded far enough, not only to demonstrate the 

 error of Hobbes, but to ascertain the real import of by far the most numer- 

 ous class of propositions. The object of belief in a proposition, when it 

 asserts any thing more than the meaning of words, is generally, as in the 

 cases which we have examined, either the co-existence or the sequence of 

 two phenomena. At the very commencenient of our inquiry, we found that 

 every act of belief implied two Things : we have now ascertained what, in^ 

 the most frequent case, these two things are, namely, two Phenomena ; in 

 other words, two states of consciousness ; and what it is which the propo- 

 sition affirms (or denies) to subsist between them, namely, either succession 

 or co-existence. And this case includes innumerable instances which no 

 one, previous to reflection, would think of referring to it. Take the follow- 

 ing example : A generous person is worthy of honor. Who would expect 

 to recognize here a case of co-existence between phenomena ? But so it is. 

 The attribute which causes a person to be termed generous, is ascribed to 

 him on the ground of states of his mind, and particulars of his conduct : 

 both are phenomena: the former are facts of internal. consciousness; the 

 latter, so far as distinct from the former, are physical facts, or perceptions 

 Df the senses. Worthy of honor admits of a similar analysis. Honor, as 

 lere used, means a state of approving and admiring emotion, followed on 

 )ccasion by corresponding outward acts. " Worthy of honor " connotes all 

 his, together with our approval of the act of showing honor. All these 

 ire phenomena ; states of internal consciousness, accompanied or followed 

 )y physical facts. When we say, A generous person is worthy of honor, 



t is both apprehended and indicated solely through the attributes. In the "living processes 

 ■ f thought and language" the extension, though in this case really thought of (which in the 

 ' ase of the predicate it is not), is thought of only through the medium of what my acute and 

 1 ourteous critic terms the "intension." 



For further illustrations of this subject, see Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Phi- 

 I ^sophy, chap. xxii. 



6 



