IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 87 



sons, in so far as prudent, are virtuous :" " Courage is deserving of hon- 

 or ;" thus, "All courageous persons are deserving of honor in so far as they 

 are courageous:" which is equivalent to this — "All courageous persons 

 deserve an addition to the honor, or a diminution of the disgrace, which 

 would attach to them on other grounds." 



In order to throw still further light upon the import of propositions of 

 which the terms are abstract, we will subjiect one of the examples given 

 above to a minuter analysis. The proposition we shall select is the follow- 

 ing: "Prudence is a virtue." Let us substitute for the word virtue an 

 equivalent but more definite expression, such as " a mental quality beneficial 

 to society," or " a mental quality pleasing to God," or whatever else we 

 adopt as the definition of virtue. What the proposition asserts is a se- 

 quence, accompanied with causation ; namely, that benefit to society, or 

 that the approval of God, is consequent on, and caused by, prudence. Here 

 is a sequence; but between what? We understand the consequent of the 

 sequence, but we have yet to analyze the antecedent. Prudence is an at- 

 tribute; and, in connection with it, two things besides itself are to be con- 

 sidered ; prudent persons, who are the subjects of the attribute, and pru- 

 dential conduct, which may be called the foundation of it. Now is either 

 of these the antecedent? and, first, is it meant, that the approval of God, 

 or benefit to society, is attendant upon all prudent 2^^'>'sons ? No ; except 

 in so far as they are prudent; for prudent persons who are scoundrels can 

 seldom, on the whole, be beneficial to society, nor can they be acceptable to 

 a good being. Is it upon prudential conduct, then, that divine approbation 

 and benefit to mankind are supposed to be invariably consequent? Neither 

 is this the assertion meant, when it is said that prudence is a virtue ; ex- 

 cept with the same reservation as before, and for the same reason, namely, 

 that prudential conduct, although in so far as it is prudential it is benefi- 

 cial to society, may yet, by reason of some other of its qualities, be produc- 

 tive of an injury outweighing the benefit, and deserve a displeasure exceed- 

 ing the approbation which would be due to the prudence. Neither the 

 substance, therefore (viz., the person), nor the phenomenon (the conduct), 

 is an antecedent on which the other tei'ra of the sequence is universally 

 consequent. But the proposition, " Prudence is a virtue," is a universal 

 proposition. What is it, then, upon which the proposition affirms the ef- 

 fects in question to be universally consequent ? Upon that in the person, 

 and in the conduct, which causes them to be called prudent, and which is 

 equally in them when the action, though prudent, is wicked ; namely, a cor- 

 rect foresight of consequences, a just estimation of their importance to the 

 object in view, and repression of any unreflecting impulse at variance with 

 the deliberate purpose. These, which are states of the person's mind, are 

 the real antecedent in the sequence, the real cause in the causation, asserted 

 by the proposition. But these are also the real ground, or foundation, of 

 the attribute Prudence ; since wherever these states of mind exist we may 

 predicate prudence, even before we know whether any conduct has fol- 

 lowed. And in this manner every assertion respecting an attribute, may 

 be transformed into an assertion exactly equivalent respecting the fact or 

 phenomenon which is the ground of the attribute. And no case can be 

 assigned, where that which is predicated of the fact or phenomenon, does 

 not belong to one or other of the five species formerly enumerated: it is 

 either simple Existence, or it is some Sequence, Co-existence, Causation, or 

 Resemblance. 



And as these five are the only things which can be affirmed, so are they 



