DEFINITION. 105 



CHAPTER VIII. 



OF DEFINITION. 



§ 1. One necessary part of the theory of Names and of Propositions re- 

 mains to be treated of in this place : the theory of Definitions. As being 

 the most important of the class of propositions which we have character- 

 ized as purely verbal, they have already received some notice in the chapter 

 preceding the last. But their fuller treatment was at that time postponed, 

 because definition is so closely connected with classification, that, until the 

 nature of the latter process is in some measure understood, the former can 

 not be discussed to much purpose. 



The simplest and most correct notion of a Definition is, a proposition 

 declaratory of the meaning of a word ; namely, either the meaning which 

 it bears in common acceptation, or that which the speaker or Avriter, for 

 the particular purposes of his discourse, intends to annex to it. 



The definition of a word being the proposition which enunciates its 

 meaning, words which have no meaning are unsusceptible of definition. 

 Proper names, therefoi'c, can not be defined. A proper name being a mere 

 mark put upon an individual, and of which it is the characteristic property 

 to be destitute of meaning, its meaning can not of course be declared ; 

 though we may indicate by language, as we might indicate still more con- 

 veniently by pointing with the finger, upon what individual that particular 

 mark has been, or is intended to be, put. It is no definition of " John 

 Thomson " to say he is " the son of General Thomson ;" for the name John 

 Thomson does not express this. Neither is it any definition of " John 

 Thomson " to say he is " the man now crossing the street." These propo- 

 sitions may serve to make known who is the particular man to whom the 

 name belongs, but that may be done still more unambiguously by pointing 

 to him, which, however, has not been esteemed one of the modes of defi- 

 nition. 



In the case of connotative names, the meaning, as has been so often ob- 

 served, is the connotation ; and the definition of a connotative name, is the 

 proposition which declares its connotation. This might be done either di- 

 rectly or indirectly. The direct mode would be by a proposition in this 

 form: "Man" (or whatsoever the word may be) "is a name connoting such 

 and such attributes," or "is a name which, when predicated of any thing, 

 signifies the possession of such and sftch attributes by that thing." Or 

 thus : Man is every thing which possesses such and such attributes : Man 

 is every thing Avhich possesses corporeity, organization, life, rationality, and 

 certain peculiarities of external form. 



This form of definition is the most precise and least equivocal of any ; 

 but it is not brief enough, and is besides too technical for common discourse. 

 The more usual mode of declaring the connotation of a name, is to predi- 

 cate of it- another name or names of known signification, which connote the 

 same aggregation of attributes. This may be done either by predicating 

 of the name intended to be defined, another connotative name exactly syn- 

 onymous, as, " Man is a human being," which is not commonly accounted a 



