106 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



definition at all; or by predicating two or more connotative names, which 

 make up among them the whole connotation of the name to be defined. In 

 this last case, again, we may either compose our definition of as many con- 

 notative names as there are attributes, each attribute being connoted by 

 one, as, Man is a corporeal, organized, animated, rational being, shaped so 

 and so; or we employ names which connote several of the attributes at 

 once, as, Man is a rational animal, shaped so and so. 



The definition of a name, according to this view of it, is the sum total 

 of all the essential propositions which can be framed with that name for 

 their subject. All propositions the truth of which is implied in the name, 

 all those Avhich we are made aware of by merely hearing the name, are in- 

 cluded in the definition, if complete, and may be evolved from it without 

 the aid of any other premises; whether the definition expresses them in 

 two or three words, or in a larger number. It is, therefore, not without 

 reason that Condillac and other writei's have aftirmed a definition to be an 

 analysis. To resolve any complex whole into the elements of which it is 

 compounded, is the meaning of analysis : and this we do when we replace 

 one word which connotes a set of attributes collectively, by two or more 

 which connote the same attributes singly, or in smaller groups. , 



§ 2. From this, however, the question naturally arises, in ^\^lat manner 

 are we to define a name which connotes only a single attribute : for in- 

 stance, " white," which connotes nothing but whiteness ; " rational," which 

 connotes nothing but the possession of reason. It might seem that the 

 meaning of such names could only be declared in two ways ; by a synony- 

 mous term, if any such can be found ; or in the direct way already alluded 

 to : " White is a name connoting the attribute whiteness." Let us see, 

 however, whether the analysis of the meaning of the name, that is, the 

 breaking down of that meaning into several parts, admits of being carried 

 farther. Without at present deciding this question as to the word tohite, 

 it is obvious that in the case of rational some further explanation may be 

 given of its meaning than is contained in the proposition, " Rational is that 

 which possesses the attribute of reason ;" since the attribute reason itself 

 admits of being defined. And here we must turn our attention to the def- 

 initions of attributes, or rather of the names of attributes, that is, of ab- 

 stract names. 



In regard to such names of attributes as are connotative, and express 

 attributes of those attributes, there is no diificulty : like other connotative 

 names, they are defined by declaring their connotation. Thus the word 

 fault may be defined, " a quality productive of evil or inconvenience." 

 Sometimes, again, the attribute to be defined is not one attribute, but a 

 union of several : we have only, thei'efore, to put together the names of all 

 the attributes taken separately, and we obtain the definition of the name 

 which belongs to them all taken together; a definition which will coi're- 

 spond exactly to that of the corresponding concrete name. For, as we de- 

 fine a concrete name by enumerating the attributes which it connotes, and 

 as tlie attributes connoted by a concrete name form the entire signification 

 of the corresponding abstract name, the same enumeration will serve for 

 the definition of both. Thus, if the definition of a human being be this, 

 " a being, corporeal, animated, rational, shaped so and so," the definition of 

 hum.anity Avill be corporeity and animal life, combined with rationality, 

 and with such and such a shape. 



When, on the other hand, the abstract name does not express a compli- 



