DEFINITION. 10 V 



cation of attributes, but a single attribute, we must remember that every 

 attribute is grounded on some fact or phenomenon, from which, and which 

 alone, it derives its meaning. To that fact or phenomenon, called -in a for- 

 mer chapter the foundation of the attribute, we must, therefore, have re- 

 course for its definition. Now, the foundation of the attribute may be 

 a phenomenon of any degree of complexity, consisting of many different 

 parts, either co-existent or in succession. To obtain a definition of the attri- 

 bute, we must analyze the phenomenon into these parts. Eloquence, for 

 example, is the name of one attribute only ; but this attribute is grounded 

 on external effects of a complicated nature, flowing from acts of the person 

 to whom Ave ascribe the attribute; and by resolving this phenomenon of 

 causation into its two parts, the cause and the effect, we obtain a definition 

 of eloquence, viz. the power of influencing the feelings by speech or writing. 

 A name, therefore, whether concrete or abstract, admits of definition, 

 provided we are able to analyze, that is, to distinguish into parts, the attri- 

 bute or set of attributes which constitute the meaning both of the concrete 

 name and of the corresponding abstract: if a set of attributes, by enumer- 

 ating them; if a single attribute, by dissecting the fact or phenomenon 

 (whether of perception or of internal consciousness) which is the foundation 

 of the attribute. But, further, ev^en when the fact is one of our simple 

 feelings or states of consciousness, and therefore unsusceptible of analy- 

 sis, the names both of the object and of the attribute still admit of defini- 

 tion ; or rather, would do so if all our simple feelings had names. White- 

 ness may be defined, the property or power of exciting the sensation of 

 white. A white object may be defined, an object which excites the sensation 

 of white. The only names which are unsusceptible of definition, because 

 their meaning is unsusceptible of analysis, are the names of the simple feel- 

 ings themselves. These are in the same condition as proper names. They 

 are not indeed, like proper names, unmeaning ; for the words sensation 

 of lohite signify, that the sensation which I so denominate resembles other 

 sensations which I remember to have had before, and to have called by that 

 name. But as we have no words by which to recall those former sensations, 

 except the very word which we seek to define, or some other which, being 

 exactly synonymous with it, requires definition as much, words can not un- 

 fold the signification of this class of names ; and we are obliged to make a 

 direct appeal to the personal experience of the individual whom we address. 



§ 3. Having stated what seems to be the true idea of a Definition, I pro- 

 ceed to examine some opinions of philosophers, and some popular concep- 

 tions on the subject, which conflict more or less with that idea. 



The only adequate definition of a name is, as already remarked, one which 

 declares the facts, and the whole of the facts, which the name involves in 

 its signification. But with most persons the object of a definition does not 

 embrace so much ; they look for nothing more, in a definition, than a guide 

 to the correct use of the term — a protection against applying it in a man- 

 ner inconsistent with custom and convention. Any thing, therefore, is to 

 them a sufficient definition of a term, which will serve as a correct index 

 to what the term c/enotes ; though not embracing the whole, and some- 

 times, perhaps, not even any part, of what it connotes. This gives rise to 

 two sorts of imperfect, or unscientific definition ; Essential but incomplete 

 Definitions, and Accidental Definitions, or Descriptions. In the former, a 

 connotative name is defined by a part only of its connotation ; in the latter, 

 by something which forms no part of the connotation at all. 



