126 REASONING. 



Of Induction, therefore, we shall say no more at present, than that it at 

 least is, without doubt, a process of real inference. The conclusion in an 

 induction embraces more than is contained in the premises. The principle 

 or law collected from particular instances, the general proposition in which 

 we embody the result of our experience, covers a much larger extent of 

 ground than the individual experiments which form its basis. A principle 

 ascertained by experience, is more than a mere summing up of what has 

 been specifically observed in the individual cases which have been exam- 

 ined ; it is a generalization grounded on those cases, and expressive of our 

 belief, that what we there found true is true in an indefinite number of 

 cases which we have not examined, and are never likely to examine. The 

 nature and grounds of this inference, and the conditions necessary to make 

 it legitimate, will be the subject of discussion in the Third Book: but that 

 such inference really takes place is not susceptible of question. In every 

 induction we proceed from truths which we knew, to truths which we did 

 not know ; from facts certified by observation, to facts which we have not 

 observed, and even to facts not capable of being now observed ; future 

 facts, for example ; but which we do not hesitate to believe on the sole evi- 

 dence of the induction itself. 



Induction, then, is a real process of Reasoning or Inference. Whether, 

 and in what sense, as much can be said of the Syllogism, remains to be de- 

 termined by the examination into which we are about to enter. 



CHAPTER II. 



OF RATIOCINATION, OR SYLLOGISM. 



§ 1. The analysis of the Syllogism has been so accurately and fully per- 

 formed in the common manuals of Logic, that in the present work, which 

 is not designed as a manual, it is sufficient to recapitulate, memorice causd, 

 the leading results of that analysis, as a foundation for the remarks to be 

 afterward made on the functions of the Syllogism, and the place which it 

 holds in science. 



To a legitimate syllogism it is essential that there should be three, and 

 no more than three, propositions, namely, the conclusion, or proposition to 

 be proved, and two other propositions which together prove it, and which 

 are called the premises. It is essential that there should be three, and no 

 more than three, terms, namely, the subject and predicate of the conclu- 

 sion, and another called the middle term, which must be found in both 

 premises, since it is by means of it that the other two terms are to be con- 

 nected together. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major terra 

 of the syllogism; the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term. 

 As there can be but three terms, the major and minor terms must each be 

 found in one, and only one, of the premises, together with the middle term 

 which is in them both. The premise which contains the middle term and 

 the major term is called the major premise ; that which contains the mid- 

 dle term and the minor term is called the minor premise. 



Syllogisms are divided by some logicians into three figures, by others 

 into four, according to the position of the middle term, which may either 

 be the subject in both premises, the predicate in both, or the subject in 

 one and the predicate in the other. The most common case is that in which 



