128 . KEASONING. 



The reasons why syllogisms in any of the above forms are legitimate, 

 that is, why, if the premises are true, the conclusion must inevitably be so, 

 and why this is not the case in any other possible mood (that is, in any 

 other combination of universal and particular, affirmative and negative 

 propositions), any person taking interest in these inquiries may be pre- 

 sumed to have either learned from the common-school books of the syllo- 

 gistic logic, or to be capable of discovering for himself. The reader may, 

 however, be referred, for every needful explanation, to Archbishop Whate- 

 ly's Elemeiits of Logic, where he will find stated with philosophical pre- 

 cision, and explained with remarkable perspicuity, the whole of the com- 

 mon doctrine of the syllogism. 



All valid ratiocination ; all reasoning by which, from general propositions 



reasoning at all. We have given in Socrates, inter alia, the facts wise, poor, and a man, and 

 we merely repeat the concurrence which is selected from the whole aggregate of properties 

 making up the whole, Socrates. The case is one under the head 'Greater and Less Connota- 

 tion ' in Equivalent Propositional Forms, or Immediate Inference. 



"But the example in this form does not do justice to the syllogism of singulars. We must 

 suppose both propositions to be real, the predicates being in no way involved in the subject. 

 Thus 



Socrates was the master of Plato, 



Socrates fought at Delium, 



The master of Plato fought at Delium. 



"It may fairly be doubted whether the transitions, in this instance, are any thing more 

 than equivalent forms. For the proposition ' Socrates was the master of Plato and fought at 

 Delium,' compounded out of the two premises, is obviously nothing more than a grammatical 

 abbreviation. No one can say that there is here any change of meaning, or any thing beyond 

 a verbal modification of the original form. The next step is, ' The master of Plato fought at 

 Delium,' whicli is the previous statement cut down by the omission of Socrates. It contents 

 itself with reproducing a part of the meaning, or saying less than had been previously said. 

 The full equivalent of the affirmation is, 'The master of Plato fought at Delium, and the 

 master of Plato was Socrates:' the new form omits the last piece of information, and gives 

 only the first. Now, we never consider that we have made a real inference, a step in advance, 

 when we repeat less than we are entitled to say, or drop from a complex statement some por- 

 tion not desired at the moment. Such an operation keeps strictly within the domain of equiv- 

 alence, or Immediate Inference. In no way, therefore, can a syllogism with two singular 

 premises be viewed as a genuine syllogistic or deductive inference." (Logic, i., 159.) 



The first argument, as Avill have been seen, rests upon the supposition that the name Soc- 

 rates has a meaning ; that man, wise, and poor, are parts of this meaning ; and that by predi- 

 cating them of Socrates we convey no information ; a view of the signification of names 

 which, for reasons already given,* I can not admit, and which, as applied to the class of names 

 which Socrates belongs to, is at war with Mr. Bain's own definition of a Proper Name (i., 148), 

 "a single meaningless mark or designation appropriated to the thing." Such names, Mr. 

 Bain proceeded to say, do not necessarily indicate even human beings : much less then does 

 the name Socrates include the meaning of wise or poor. Otherwise it would follow that if 

 Socrates had grown rich, or had lost his mental faculties by illness, he would no longer have 

 been called Socrates. 



The second part of Mr. Bain's argument, in which he contends that even when the premises 

 convey real information, the conclusion is merely the premises with a part left out, is applica- 

 ble, if at all, as much to universal propositions as to singular. In every syllogism the con- 

 clusion contains less than is asserted in the two premises taken together. Suppose the syllo- 

 gism to be 



All bees are intelligent, 



All bees are insects, therefore 



Some insects are intelligent : 



one might use the same liberty taken by Mr. Bain, of joining together the two premises as if 

 they were one — "All bees are insects and intelligent" — and might say that in omitting the 

 middle term bees we make no real inference, but merely reproduce part of what had been pre- 

 viously said. Mr. Bain's is really an objection to the syllogism itself, or at all events to the 

 third figure : it has no special applicability to singular propositions. 



* Note to § 4 of the chapter on Definition, supra, pp. 110, 111. 



