FUNCTIONS AND VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 157 



between it and Logic in the widest sense. Logic, as I conceive it, is the 

 entire theory of the ascertainment of reasoned or inferred truth. Formal 

 Logic, therefore, which Sir William Hamilton from his own point of view, 

 and Archbishop Whately from his, have represented as the whole of Logic 

 properly so called, is really a very subordinate part of it, not being direct- 

 ly concerned with the process of Reasoning or Inference in the sense i 

 which that process is a part of the Investigation of Truth. What, the 

 is Formal Logic ? The name seems to be properly applied to all that por 

 tion of doctrine which relates to the equivalence of different modes of ex 

 pression ; the rules for determining when assertions in a given form imply 

 or suppose the truth or falsity of other assertions. This includes the theo- 

 ry of the Import of Propositions, and of their Conversion, ^quipoUence, 

 and Opposition ; of those falsely called Inductions (to be hereafter spoken 

 of)*, in which the apparent generalization is a mere abridged statement of 

 cases known individually ; and finally, of the syllogism : while the theory of 

 Naming, and of (what is inseparably connected with it) Definition, though 

 belonging still more to the other and larger kind of logic than to this, is a 

 necessary preliminary to this. The end aimed at by Formal Logic, and 

 attained by the observance of its precepts, is not truth, but consistency^ 

 It has been seen that this is the only direct purpose of the rules of tne 

 syllogism ; the intention and effect of which is simply to keep our infer- 

 ences or conclusions in complete consistency with our general formulae or 

 directions for drawing them. The Logic of Consistency is a necessary 

 auxiliary to the logic of truth, not only because what is inconsistent with 

 itself or with other truths can not be true, but also because truth can only 

 be successfully pursued by drawing inferences from experience, which, if 

 warrantable at all, admit of being generalized, and, to test their warrant- 

 ableness, require to be exhibited in a generalized form ; after which the 

 correctness of their application to particular cases is a question which spe- 

 cially concerns the Logic of Consistency. This Logic, not requiring any 

 preliminary knowledge of the processes or conclusions of the various sci- 

 ences, may be studied with benefit in a much earlier stage of education 

 than the Logic of Truth : and the j^ractice which has empirically obtained 

 of teaching it apart, through elementary treatises which do not attempt to 

 include any thing else, though the reasons assigned for the practice are in 

 general very far from philosophical, admits of philosophical justification. 



consideration, is, Socrates is like A, B, C, and the other individuals who are known to have 

 died. And this is the only universal type of that step in the reasoning process which is rep- 

 resented by the minor. Experience, however, of the uncertainty of this loose mode of infer- 

 ence, teaches the expediency of determining beforehand what kind of likeness to the cases ob- 

 served, is necessary to bring an unobserved case within the same predicate ; and the answer 

 to this question is the major. The minor then identifies the precise kind of likeness possessed 

 by Socrates, as being the kind required by tlie formula. Thus the syllogistic major and the 

 syllogistic minor start into existence together, and are called forth by the same exigency. 

 When we conclude from persbnal experience without referring to any record — to any general 

 theorems, either written, or traditional, or mentally registered by ourselves as conclusions of 

 our own drawing — we do not use, in our thoughts, either a major or a minor, such as the syl- 

 logism puts- into words. When, however, we revise this rough inference from particulars to 

 particulars, and substitute a careful one, the revision consists in selecting two syllogistic prem- 

 ises. But this neither alters nor adds to the evidence we had before ; it only puts us in a 

 better position for judging whether our inference from particulars to particulars is well 

 grounded. 

 * Infra, book ill., chap. ii. 



