TRAINS OF REASONING. 159 



spot with the given property, and found that they possessed the properties 

 connoted by the word arsenic ; they were metaUic, volatile, their vapor liad 

 a smell of garlic, and so forth. Next, we, or others for us, have examined 

 various specimens which possessed this metallic and volatile character, 

 whose vapor had this smell, etc., and have invariably found that they were 

 poisonous. The first observation we judge that we may extend to all sub- 

 stances whatever which yield that particular kind of dark spot ; the second, 

 to all metallic and volatile substances resembling those we examined ; and 

 consequently, not to those only which ai'e seen to be such, but to those 

 which are concluded to be such by the prior induction. The substance 

 before us is only seen to come within one of these inductions; but by 

 means of this one, it is brought within the other. We are still, as before, 

 concluding from particulars to particulars; but we are now concluding 

 from particulars observed, to other particulars which are not, as in the 

 simple case, see)i to resemble them in material points, but inferred to do 

 so, because resembling them in something else, which we have been led by 

 quite a different set of instances to consider as a mark of the former re- 

 semblance. 



This first example of a train of reasoning is still extremely simple, the 

 series consisting of only two syllogisms. The following is somewhat more 

 complicated : No government, which earnestly seeks the good of its sub- 

 jects, is likely to be overthi'own ; some particular government earnestly seeks 

 the good of its subjects, therefore it is not likely to be overthrown. The ma- 

 jor premise in this argument we shall suppose not to be derived from con- 

 siderations a priori,h\xt to be a generalization from history, which, wheth- 

 er correct or erroneous, must have been founded on observation of govern- 

 ments concerning whose desire of the good of their subjects there was no 

 doubt. It has been found, or thought to be found, that these were not 

 easily overthrown, and it has been deemed that those instances warranted 

 an extension of the same predicate to any and every government which 

 resembles them in the attribute of desiring earnestly the good of its sub- 

 jects. But does the government in question thus resemble them? This 

 may be debated pro and con by many arguments, and must, in any case, be 

 proved by another induction ; for we can not directly observe the senti- 

 ments and desires of the persons who carry on the government. To prove 

 the minor, therefore, we require an argument in this form : Every govern- 

 ment which acts in a certain manner, desires the good of its subjects ; the 

 supposed government acts in that particular manner, therefore it desires 

 the good of its subjects. But is it true that the government acts in the 

 manner supposed? This minor also may require proof; still another in- 

 duction, as thus : What is asserted by intelligent and disinterested witness- 

 es, may be believed to be true ; that the government acts in this manner, 

 is asserted by such witnesses, therefore it may be believed to be true. The 

 argument hence consists of three steps. Having the evidence of our senses 

 that the case of the government under consideration resembles a number 

 of former cases, in the circumstance of having something asserted respect- 

 ing it by intelligent and disinterested witnesses, we infer, first, that, as in 

 those former instances, so in this instance, the assertion is true. Secondly, 

 what was assei'ted of the government being that it acts in a particular 

 manner, and other governments or persons having been observed to act 

 in the same manner, the government in question is brought into known re- 

 semblance with those other governments or persons ; and since they were 

 known to desire the good of the people, it is thereupon, by a second indue- 



