THEORIES CONCERNING AXIOMS. 199 



of, and would sincerely disclaim founding an argument ujjon, but from 

 which his case derives no little advantage notwithstanding. By inconceiv- 

 ableness is sometimes meant, inability to form or get rid of an idea; some- 

 times, inability to form or get rid of a belief. The former meaning is the 

 most conformable to the analogy of language; for a conception always 

 means an idea, and never a belief. The wrong meaning of " inconceivable" 

 is, however, fully as frequent in philosophical discussion as the right mean- 

 ing, and the intuitive school of metaphysicians could not well do without 

 either. To illustrate the difference, we will take two contrasted examples. 

 The early physical speculators considered antipodes incredible, because in- 

 conceivable. But antipodes were not inconceivable in the primitive sense 

 of the word. An idea of them could be formed without difficulty: they 

 could be completely pictured to the mental eye. What was difficult, and, 

 as it then seemed, impossible, was to apprehend them as believable. The 

 idea could be put together, of men sticking on by their feet to the under 

 side of the earth ; but the belief would follow, that they must fall off. An- 

 tipodes were not unimaginable, but they were unbelievable. 



On the other hand, when I endeavor to conceive an end to extension, the 

 two ideas refuse to come together. "When I attempt to form a conceistion 

 of the last point of space, I can not help figuring to myself a vast space 

 beyond that last point. The combination is, under the conditions of our 

 experience, unimaginable. This double meaning of inconceivable it is very 

 important to bear in mind, for the argument from inconceivableness almost 

 always turns on the alternate substitution of each of those meanings for 

 the other. 



In which of these two senses does Mr. Spencer employ the term, when 

 he makes it a test of the truth of a proposition that its negation is incon- 

 ceivable ? Until Mr. Spencer expressly stated the contrary, I inferred from 

 the course of his argument, that he meant xmbelievable. He has, however, 

 in a paper published in the fifth number of the Fortnightly lievieio, dis- 

 claimed this meaning, and declared that by an inconceivable jjroposition 

 he means, now and always, " one of which the terms can not, by any effort, 

 be brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition as- 

 serts between them — a proposition of which the subject and predicate offer 

 an insurmountable resistance to union in thought." We now, therefore, 

 know positively that Mr. Spencer always endeavors to use the word incon- 

 ceivable in this, its proper, sense : but it may yet be questioned whether 

 his endeavor is always successful ; whether the other, and popular use of 

 the word, does not sometimes creep in with its associations, and prevent 

 him from maintaining a clear separation between the two. When, for 

 example, he says, that when I feel cold, I can not conceive that I am not 

 feeling cold, this expression can not be translated into "I can not con- 

 ceive myself not feeling cold," for it is evident that I can : the word 

 conceive, therefore, is here used to express the recognition of a matter of 

 fact — the perception of truth or falsehood ; which I apprehend to be ex- 

 actly the meaning of an act of belief, as distinguished from simple con- 

 ception. Again, Mi*. Spencer calls the attempt to conceive something 

 which is inconceivable " an abortive effort to cause the non-existence," 

 not of a conception or mental representation, but of a belief. There is 

 need, therefore, to revise a considerable part of Mr. Spencer's language, if 

 it is to be kept always consistent with his definition of inc^ 

 But in truth the point is of little importance ; since incoi 

 Mr. Spencer's theory, is only a test of truth, inasmuch asj 



