THEORIES CONCERNING AXIOMS. 201 



is under the influence of this terror he does not disbelieve in ghosts, but 

 has a temporary and uncontrollable belief in thera. Be it so ; but allowing 

 it to be so, which would it be truest to say of this man on the whole — that 

 he believes in ghosts, or that he does not believe in them ? Assuredly that 

 he does not believe in them. The case is similar with those who disbelieve 

 a material Avorld. Though they can not get rid of the idea ; though while 

 looking at a solid object they can not help having the conception, and there- 

 fore, according to Mr. Spencer's metaphysics, the momentary belief, of its 

 externality ; even at that moment they would sincerely deny holding that 

 belief : and it would be incorrect to call thera other than disbelievers of the 

 doctrine. The belief therefore is not invariable ; and the test of inconceiv- 

 ableness fails in the only cases to which there could ever be any occasion to 

 apply it. 



That a thing may be perfectly believable, and yet may not have become 

 conceivable, and that we may habitually believe one side of an alternative, 

 and conceive only in the other, is familiarly exemplified in the state of mind 

 of educated persons respecting sunrise and sunset. All educated persons 

 either know by investigation, or believe on the authority of science, that 

 it is the earth and not the sun which moves : but there are probably few 

 who habitually cojiceive the phenomenon otherwise than as the ascent or 

 descent of the sun. Assuredly no one can do so without a prolonged trial ; 

 and it is probably not easier now than in the first generation after Coper- 

 nicus. Mr. Spencer does not say, " In looking at sunrise it is impossible 

 not to conceive that it is the sun which moves, therefore this is what every 

 body believes, and we have all the evidence for it that we can have for any 

 truth." Yet this would be an exact parallel to his doctrine about the belief 

 in matter. 



The existence of matter, and other Noumena, as distinguished from the 

 phenomenal world, remains a question of argument, as it was before ; and 

 the very general, but neither necessary nor universal, belief in them, stands 

 as a psychological phenomenon to be explained, either on the hypothesis of 

 its truth, or on some other. The belief is not a conclusive proof of its own 

 truth, unless there are no such things as idola trib'ds; but being a fact, it 

 calls on antagonists to show, from what except the real existence of the 

 thing believed, so general and apparently spontaneous a belief can have 

 originated. And its opponents have never hesitated to accept this chal- 

 lenge.* The amount of their success in meeting it will probably deter- 

 mine the ultimate verdict of philosophers on the question. 



§ 4. In the revision, or rather reconstruction, of his "Principles of Psy- 

 chology," as one of the stages or platforms in the imposing structure of 

 his System of Philosophy, Mr. Spencer has resumed what he justly termsf 

 the " amicable controversy that has been long pending between us ;" ex- 

 pressing at the same time a regret, which I cordially share, that " this 

 lengthened exposition of a single point of difference, unaccompanied by 

 an exposition of the numerous points of concurrence, unavoidably produces 

 an appearance of dissent very far greater than that which exists." I be- 

 lieve, with Mr. Spencer, that the difference between us, if measured by our 

 conclusions, is " superficial rather than substantial ;" and the value I attach 

 to so great an amount of agreement, in the field of analytic psychology, 



* I have myself accepted the contest, and fought it out on this hattle-ground, in the eleventh 

 chaptei* of An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy-, 

 t Chap. xi. 



