202 REASONING. 



with a thinker of his force and depth, is such as I can hardly overstate.' 

 But I also agree with him that the difference which exists in our premises 

 is one of " profound importance, philosophically considered ;" and not to 

 be dismissed while any part of the case of either of us has not been fully 

 examined and discussed. 



In his present statement of the Universal Postulate, Mr. Spencer has ex- 

 changed his former expression, " beliefs which invariably exist," for the 

 following : " cognitions of which the predicates invariably exist along with 

 their subjects." And he says that " an abortive effort to conceive the ne- 

 gation of a proposition, shows that the cognition expressed is one of Avhich 

 the predicate invariably exists along with its subject ; and the discovery 

 that the predicate invariably exists along with its subject, is the discovery 

 that this cognition is one we are comj^elled to accept." Both these prem- 

 ises of Mr. Spencer's syllogism I am able to assent to, but in different senses 

 of the middle term. If the invariable existence of the predicate along 

 with its subject, is to be understood in the most obvious meaning, as an 

 existence in actual Nature, or in other words, in our objective, or sensa- 

 tional, experience, I of course admit that this, once ascertained, compels us 

 to accept the proposition : but then I do not admit that the failure of an at- 

 tempt to conceive the negative, proves the predicate to be always co-exist- 

 ent with the subject in actual Nature. If, on the other hand (which I believe 

 to be Mr. Spencer's meaning) the invariable existence of the predicate along 

 with the subject is to be understood only of our conceptive faculty, i. e., 

 that the one is inseparable from the other in our thoughts ; then, indeed, 

 the inability to separate the two ideas proves their inseparable conjunc- 

 tion, here and now, in the mind which has failed in the attempt ; but this 

 inseparability in thought does not prove a corresponding inseparability in 

 fact ; nor even in the thoughts of other people, or of the same person in a 

 possible future. 



" That some propositions have been wrongly accepted as true, because 

 their negations were supposed inconceivable when they were not," does 

 not, in Mr. Spencer's opinion, " disprove the validity of the test ;" not only 

 because any test whatever " is liable to yield untrue results, either from in- 

 capacity *or from carelessness in those who use it," but because the propo- 

 sitions in question " were complex propositions, not to be established by a 

 test applicable to propositions no further decomposable." " A test legiti- 

 mately applicable to a simple proposition, the subject and predicate of which 

 are in direct relation, can not be legitimately applied to a complex proposi- 

 tion, the subject and predicate of which are indirectly related through the 

 many simple propositions implied." " That things which are equal to the 

 same thing are equal to one another, is a fact which can be known by di- 

 rect comparison of actual or ideal relations But that the square of 



the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle equals the sum of the squares 

 of the other two sides, can not be known immediately by comparison of 

 two states of consciousness : here the truth can be reached only mediately, 

 through a series of simple judgments respecting the likenesses or unlike- 

 nesses of certain relations." Moreover, even Avhen the proposition admits 

 of being tested by immediate consciousness, people often neglect to do it. 

 A school-boy, in adding uj) a column of figures, will say " 35 and 9 are 46," 

 though this is contrary to the verdict which consciousness gives when 35 

 and 9 are really called up before it; but this is not done. And not only 

 school-boys, but men and thinkers, do not always " distinctly translate into 

 their equivalent states of consciousness the words they use." 



