220 INDUCTION. 



In every way, therefore, it is evident that to explain induction as the 

 colligation of facts by means of appropriate conceptions, that is, concep- 

 tions which will really express them, is to confound mere description of the 

 observed facts with inference from those facts, and ascribe to the latter 

 ^at is a characteristic property of the former. 



There is, however, between Colligation and Induction, a real correlation, 

 which it is important to conceive correctly. Colligation is not always in- 

 duction ; but induction is always colligation. The assertion that the plan- 

 ets move in ellipses, was but a mode of representing observed facts ; it was 

 but a colligation ; while the assertion that they are drawn, or tend, toward 

 the sun, was the statement of a new fact, inferred by induction. But the 

 induction, once made, accomplishes the purposes of colligation likewise. It 

 brings the same facts, M'hich Kepler had connected by his conception of an 

 ellipse, under the additional conception of bodies acted upon by a central 

 force, and serves, therefore, as a new bond of connection for those facts ; a 

 new principle for their classification. 

 /^ Further, the descriptions which are improperly confounded with induc- 

 [ tion, are nevertheless a necessary preparation for induction ; no less neces- 

 1 sary than correct observation of the facts themselves. Without the pre- 

 vious colligation of detached observations by means of one general concep- 

 tion, we could never have obtained any basis for an induction, except in 

 the case of phenomena of very limited compass. We should not be able 



possible that both opinions can be true. As well might it be said that there is no contradic- 

 tion between the assertions, tliat a man died because somebody killed him, and that he died a 

 natural death. 



So, again, the theory that the planets move by a virtue inherent in their celestial nature, is 

 incompatible with either of the two others : either that of their being moved by vortices, or 

 that which regards them as moving by a property which they have in common with the earth 

 and all terrestrial bodies. Dr. Whewell says that the theory of an inherent virtue agrees with 

 Newton's when the word inherent is left out, which of course it would be (he says) if "found 

 to be untenable." But leave that out, and wliere is the theory? The word inherent is the 

 theory. When that is omitted, there remains nothing except that the heavenly bodies move 

 "by a virtue," i. e., by a power of some sort; or by virtue of their celestial nature, which di- 

 rectly contradicts the doctrine that terrestrial bodies fall by the same law. 



If Dr. Whewell is not yet satisfied, any other subject will serve equally well to test his doc- 

 trine. He will hardly say that there is no contradiction between the emission theory and the 

 undulatory theory of light ; or that there can be both one and two electricities ; or that the 

 hypothesis of the production of the higher organic forms by development from the lower, and 

 the supposition of separate and successive acts of creation, are quite reconcilable ; or that 

 the theory that volcanoes are fed from a central fire, and the doctrines which ascribe them to 

 chemical action at a comparatively small depth below the earth's sui'face, are consistent with 

 one another, and all true as far as they go. 



If different explanations of the same fact can not both be true, still less, surely, can differ- 

 ent predictions. Dr. Whewell quarrels (on what ground it is not necessary here to consider) 

 with the example I had chosen on this point, and thinks an objection to an illustration a suf- 

 ficient answer to a theory. Examples not liable to his objection are easily found, if the prop- 

 osition that conflicting predictions can not both be true, can be made clearer by any examples. 

 Suppose the phenomenon to be a newly-discovered comet, and that one astronomer predicts 

 its return once in every 300 years — another once in every 400 : can they both be right ? 

 When Columbus predicted that by sailing constantly westward he should in time return to 

 the point from which he set out, while others asserted that he could never do so except by 

 turning back, were both he and his opponents true prophets? Were the predictions which 

 foretold the wonders of railways and steamships, and those which averred that the Atlantic 

 could never be crossed by steam navigation, nor a railway train propelled ten miles an hour, 

 both (in Dr. Whewell's words) " true, and consistent with one another?" 



Dr. Whewell sees no distinction between holding contradictory opinions on a question of 

 fact, and merely employing different analogies to fiicilitate the conception of the same fact. 

 The case of different Inductions belongs to the foi-mer class, that of different Descriptions to 

 the latter. 



