GROUND OF INDUCTION. 225 



The statement, that the uniformity of the course of nature is the ulti- 

 mate major premise in all cases of induction, may be thought to require 

 some explanation. The immediate major premise in every inductive argu- 

 ment, it certainly is not. Of that. Archbishop Whately's must be held to 

 be the correct account. The induction, " John, Peter, etc, are mortal, there- 

 fore all mankind are mortal," may, as he justly says, be thrown into a syl- 

 logism by prefixing as a major premise (what is at any rate a necessary 

 condition of the validity of the argument), namely, that what is true of 

 John, Peter, etc., is true of all mankind. But how came Ave by this ma- 

 jor premise ? It is not self-evident ; nay, in all cases of unwarranted gen- 

 eralization, it is not true. How, then, is it arrived at ? Necessarily either 

 by induction or ratiocination ; and if by induction, the process, like all oth- 

 er inductive arguments, may be thrown into the form of a syllogism. This 

 previous syllogism it is, therefore, necessary to construct. There is, in the 

 long run, only one possible construction. The real proof that what is true 

 of John, Peter, etc., is true of all mankind, can only be, that a different sup- 

 position would be inconsistent with the uniformity which we know to exist 

 in the course of nature. Whether there would be this inconsistency or not, 

 may be a matter of long and delicate inquiry; but unless there would, we 

 have no sufficient ground for the major of the inductive syllogism. It 

 hence appears, that if we throw the whole course of any inductive argu- 

 ment into a series of syllogisms, we shall arrive by more or fewer steps at 

 an ultimate syllogism, which will have for its major premise the principle, 

 or axiom, of the uniformity of the course of nature.* 



It was not to be expected that in the case of this axiom, any more than 

 of other axioms, there should be unanimity among thinkers with respect to 

 the grounds on which it is to be received as true. I have already stated 

 that I regard it as itself a generalization from experience. Others hold it 

 to be a principle which, antecedently to any verification by experience, we 



yarded as an illustration of them, failed, as I now saw, to bear them out. The real matter at 

 the bottom of the whole dispute, the different view we take of the function of the major prem- 

 ise, remains exactly where it was ; and so far was I from thinking that my opinion had 

 seen fully "answered" and was "untenable," that in the same edition in which I canceled 

 ;he note, I not only enforced the opinion by further arguments, but answered (though without 

 laming him) those of the Archbishop. 



For not having made this statement before, I do not think it needful to apologize. It would 

 )e attaching very great importance to one's smallest sayings, to think a formal retractation req- 

 lisite every time that one falls into an error. Nor is Archbishop Whately's well-earned fame 

 )f so tender a quality as to require that in withdrawing a slight criticism on him I should have 

 )een bound to offer a public amende for having made it. 



* But though it is a condition of the validity of every induction that there be uniformity in 

 he course of nature, it is not a necessary condition that the uniformity should pervade all na- 

 ure. It is enough that it pei-vades the particular class of phenomena to which the induction 

 elates. An induction concerning the motions of the planets, or the properties of the magnet, 

 v-ould not be vitiated though we were to suppose that wind and weather are the sport of 

 hance, provided it be assumed that astronomical and magnetic phenomena are under the 

 ominion of general laws. Otherwise the early experience of mankind would have rested on 

 . very weak foundation ; for in the infancy of science it could not be known that all phe- 

 omena are regular in their course. 



Neither would it be correct to say that every induction by which we infer any truth, implies 

 '■ le general feet of unifonnity as foreknown, even in reference to the kind of phenomena con- 

 < erned. It implies, either that this general fact is already known, or that we may now know 

 i : as the conclusion, the Duke of Wellington is mortal, drawn from the instances A, B, and 

 < ', implies either that we have already concluded all men to be mortal, or that we are now en- 

 1 tied to do so from the same evidence. A vast amount of confusion and paralogism respect- 

 i ig the grounds of Induction would be dispelled bj keeping in view these simple consider- 

 t tions. 



15 



