272 INDUCTION. 



CHAPTER YII. 



OF OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENT. 



§ 1. It results from the preceding exposition, that the process of ascer- 

 taining what consequents, in nature, are invariably connected with what 

 antecedents, or in other words what phenomena are related to each other 

 as causes and effects, is in some sort a process of analysis. That every 

 fact which begins to exist has a cause, and that this cause must be found 

 in some fact or concourse of facts which immediately preceded the occur- 

 rence, may be taken for certain. The whole of the present facts are the 

 infallible result of all past facts, and more immediately of all the facts 

 which existed at the moment previous. Here, then, is a great sequence, 

 which we know to be uniform. If the whole prior state of the entire uni- 

 verse could again recur, it would again be followed by the present state. 

 The question is, how to resolve this complex uniformity into the simpler 

 uniformities which compose it, and assign to each portion of the vast an- 

 tecedent the portion of the consequent which is attendant on it. 



This operation, which we have called analytical, inasmuch as it is the 

 resolution of a complex whole into the component elements, is more than 

 a merely mental analysis. No mere contemplation of the phenomena, and 

 partition of them by the intellect alone, will of itself accomplish the end we 

 have now in view. Nevertheless, such a mental partition is an indispensa- 

 ble first step. The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents 

 at every instant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must decompose 

 each choas into single facts. We must learn to see in the chaotic ante- 

 cedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic consequent a mul- 

 titude of distinct consequents. This, supposing it done, will not of itself 

 tell us on which of the antecedents each consequent is invariably attendant. 

 To determine that point, we must endeavor to effect a separation of the 

 facts from one another, not in our minds only, but in nature. The mental 

 analysis, however, must take place first. And every one knows that in the 

 mode of performing it, one intellect differs immensely from another. It is 

 the essence of the act of observing ; for the observer is not he who merely 

 sees the thing which is before his eyes, but he who sees what parts that 

 thing is composed of. To do this well is a rare talent. One person, from 

 inattention, or attending only in the wrong place, overlooks half of what he 

 sees; another sets down much more than he sees, confounding it with what 

 he imagines, or with what he infers ; another takes note of the kind of all 

 the circumstances, but being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the 

 quantity of each vague and uncertain ; another sees indeed the whole, but 

 makes such an awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one 

 mass which require to be separated, and separating others which might 

 more conveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the same, 

 sometimes even worse, than if no analysis had been attempted at all. It 

 would be possible to point out what qualities of mind, and modes of men- 

 tal culture, fit a person for being a good observer: that, however, is a 

 question not of Logic, but of the Theory of Education, in the most en- 

 larged sense of the term. There is not properly an Art of Observing. 



