ANALOGY. 393 



CHAPTER XX. 



OP ANALOGY. 



§ 1. The word Analogy, as the name of a mode of reasoning, is generally 

 taken for some kind of argument supposed to be of an inductive nature, 

 but not amounting to a complete induction. There is no word, however, 

 which is used more loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than Analogy. 

 It sometimes stands for arguments which may be examples of the most 

 rigorous induction. Archbishop Whately, for instance, following Fergu- 

 son and other writers, defines Analogy conformably to its primitive accep- 

 tation, that which was given to it by mathematicians : Resemblance of Re- 

 lations. In this sense, when a country which has sent out colonies is term- 

 ed the mother country, the expression is analogical, signifying that the col- 

 onies of a country stand in the same relation to her in which children 

 stand to their parents. And if any inference be drawn from this resem- 

 blance of relations, as, for instance, that obedience or affection is due from 

 colonies to the mother country, this is called reasoning by analogy. Or, if 

 it be ai'gued that a nation is most beneficially governed by an assembly 

 elected by the people, from the admitted fact that other associations for a 

 common purpose, such as joint-stock companies, are best managed by a 

 committee chosen by the parties interested ; this, too, is an argument from 

 analogy in the preceding sense, because its foundation is, not that a nation 

 is like a joint-stock company, or Parliament like a board of directors, but 

 that Parliament stands in the same relation to the nation in which a board 

 of directors stands to a joint-stock company. Now, in an argument of this 

 nature, there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness. Like other argu- 

 ments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may be a perfect 

 and conclusive induction. The circumstance in which the two cases re- 

 semble, may be capable of being shown to be the material circumstance ; 

 to be that on which all the consequences, necessary to be taken into ac- 

 count in the particular discussion, depend. In the example last given, the 

 resemblance is one of relation; the fundamentum relationis being the 

 management, by a few persons, of affairs in which a much greater number 

 are interested along with them. Now, some may contend that this cir- 

 cumstance which is common to the two cases, and the various consequences 

 which follow from it, have the chief share in determining all the effects 

 which make up what we term good or bad administration. If they can es- 

 tablish this, their argument has the force of a rigorous induction ; if they 

 can not, they are said to have failed in proving the analogy between the 

 two cases ; a mode of speech which implies that when the analogy can be 

 proved, the argument founded on it can not be resisted. 



§ 2. It is on the whole more usual, however, to extend the name of ana- 

 logical evidence to arguments from any sort of resemblance, provided they 

 do not amount to a complete induction ; without peculiarly distinguishing 

 resemblance of relations. Analogical reasoning, in this sense, may be re- 

 duced to the following formula : Two things resemble each other in one or 



