400 INDUCTION. 



maments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events 

 may succeed one another at random, without any fixed law ; nor can any 

 thing in our experience, or in our mental nature, constitute a sufficient, or 

 indeed any, reason for believing that this is nowhere the case. 



Were we to suppose (what it is perfectly possible to imagine) that the 

 present order of the universe were brought to an end, and that a chaos suc- 

 ceeded in which there was no fixed succession of events, and the past gave 

 no assurance of the future ; if a human being were miraculously kept alive 

 to witness this change, he surely would soon cease to believe in any uni- 

 formity, the uniformity itself no longer existing. If this be admitted, the 

 belief in uniformity either is not an instinct, or it is an instinct conquera- 

 ble, like all other instincts, by acquired knowledge. 



But there is no need to speculate on what might be, when we have posi- 

 tive and certain knowledge of what has been. It is not true, as a matter 

 of fact, that mankind have always believed that all the successions of events 

 were uniform and according to fixed laws. The Greek philosophers, not 

 even excepting Aristotle, recognized Chance and Spontaneity {rvxn ^nd to 

 avTOf.iaTor) as among the agents in nature; in other words, they believed 

 that to that extent there was no guarantee that the past had been similar 

 to itself, or that the future would resemble the past. Even now a full half 

 of the philosophical world, including the very same metaphysicians who 

 contend most for the instinctive character of the belief in uniformity, con- 

 sider one important class of phenomena, volitions, to be an exception to 

 the uniformity, and not governed by a fixed law.* 



§ 2. As was observed in a former place,f the belief we entertain in the 

 universality, throughout nature, of the law of cause and effect, is itself an 

 instance of induction ; and by no means one of the earliest which any of 



* I am happy to be able to quote the following excellent passage from Mr. Baden Powell's 

 JE^ssar/ on the Inductive Philosophy, in confirmation, both in regard to history and to doctrine, 

 of the statement made in the text. Speaking of the " conviction of the universal and perma- 

 nent uniformity of nature," Mr. Powell says (pp. 98-100) : 



"We may remark that this idea, in its proper extent, is by no means one of popular ac- 

 ceptance or natural growth. Just so far as the daily experience of every one goes, so far in- 

 deed he comes to embrace a certain persuasion of this kind, but merely to this limited extent, 

 that what is going on around him at present, in his own narrow sphere of observation, will 

 go on in like manner in future. The peasant believes that the sun which rose to-day will rise 

 again to-morrow ; that the seed put into the ground will be followed in due time by the har- 

 vest this year as it was last year, and the like ; but has no notion of such inferences in sub- 

 jects beyond his immediate observation. And it should be observed that each class of per- 

 sons, in admitting this belief within the limited range of his own experience, though he 

 doubt or deny it in every thing beyond, is, in fact, beai-ing unconscious testimony to its uni- 

 versal truth. Nor, again, is it only among the viost ignorant that this limitation is put upon 

 the truth. There is a very general propensity to believe that every thing beyond common ex- 

 perience, or especially ascertained laws of nature, is left to the dominion of chance or fate or 

 arbitrary intervention ; and even to object to any attempted explanation by physical causes, 

 if conjecturally thrown out for an apparently unaccountable phenomenon. 



"The precise doctrine of the generalization of this idea of the uniformity of nature, so far 

 from being obvious, natural, or intuitive, is utterly beyond the attainment of the many. In 

 all the extent of its universality it is characteristic of the philosopher. It is clearly the re- 

 sult of philosophic cultivation and training, and by no means the spontaneous offspring of any 

 primary principle naturally inherent in the mind, as some seem to believe. It is no mere 

 vague persuasion taken up without examination, as a common prepossession to which we are 

 always accustomed ; on the contrary, all common prejudices and associations are against it. It 

 is pre-eminently an acquired idea. It is not attained without deep study and reflection. The 

 best informed philosopher is the man who most firmly believes it, even in opposition to received 

 notions ; its acceptance depends on the extent and profoundness of his inductive studies." 



t Supra, book iii., chap, iii., § 1. 



