468 OPERATIONS SUBSIDLA.EY TO INDUCTION. 



attribute or attributes connoted by each concrete general name, and de- 

 noted by the corresponding abstract. Since abstract names, in the order 

 of their creation, do not precede but follow concrete ones, as is proved by 

 the etymological fact that they are almost always derived from them ; we 

 may consider their meaning as detei'mined by, and dependent on, the mean- 

 ing of their concrete ; and thus the problem of giving a distinct meaning 

 to general language, is all included in that of giving a precise connotation 

 to all concrete general names. 



This is not difficult in the case of new names ; of the technical terms 

 created by scientific inquirers for the purposes of science or art. But 

 when a name is in common use, the difficulty is greater ; the problem in 

 this case not being that of choosing a convenient connotation for the name, 

 but of ascertaining and fixing the connotation with which it is already 

 used. That this can ever be a matter of doubt, is a sort of paradox. But 

 the vulgar (including in that term all who have not accurate habits of 

 thought) seldom know exactly what assertion they intend to make, what 

 common property they mean to express, when they apply the same name to 

 a number of different things. All which the name expresses with them, 

 when they predicate it of an object, is a confused feeling of resemblance 

 between that object and some of the other things which they have been 

 accustomed to denote by the name. They have applied the name Stone 

 to various objects previously seen ; they see a new object, which appears 

 to them somewhat like the former, and they call it a stone, without asking 

 themselves in what respect it is like, or what mode or degree of resem- 

 blance the best authorities, or even they themselves, require as a warrant 

 for using the name. This rough general impi'ession of resemblance is, 

 however, made up of particular circumstances of resemblance ; and into 

 these it is the business of the logician to analyze it; to ascertain what 

 points of resemblance among the different things commonly called by the 

 name, have produced in the common mind this vague feeling of likeness; 

 have given to the things the similarity of aspect, which has made them a 

 class, and has caused the same name to be bestowed upon them. 



But though general names are imposed by the vulgar without any more 

 definite connotation than that of a vague resemblance; general proposi- 

 tions come in time to be made, in which predicates are applied to those 

 names, that is, general assertions are made concerning the whole of the 

 things which are denoted by the name. And since by each of these prop- 

 ositions some attribute, more or less precisely conceived, is of course pred- 

 icated, the ideas of these various attributes thus become associated with 

 the name, and in a sort of uncertain Avay it comes to connote them ; there 

 is a hesitation to ajsply the name in any new case in which any of the at- 

 tributes familiarly predicated of the class do not exist. And thus, to 

 common minds, the propositions which they are in the habit of hearing or 

 uttering concerning a class make up in a loose way a sort of connotation 

 for the class name. Let us take, for instance, the word Civilized. Hnw 

 few could be found, even among the most educated persons, who would 

 undertake to say exactly what the term Civilized connotes. Yet there is 

 a feeling in the minds of all who use it, that they are using it with a mean- 

 ing ; and this meaning is made up, in a confused manner, of every thing 

 which they have heard or read that civilized men or civilized communities 

 are, or may be expected to be. 



It is at this stage, probably, in the progress of a concrete name, that the 

 corresponding abstract name generally comes into use. Under the notion 



