TERMINOLOGY AND NOMENCLATURE. 487 



least, of approbation or censure ; insomuch that to employ those names in 

 conjunction with others by which the contrary sentiments were expressed, 

 would produce the effect of a paradox, or even a contradiction in terms. 

 The baneful influence of a connotation thus acquired, on the prevailing hab- 

 its of thought, especially in morals and politics, has been well pointed out 

 on many occasions by Bentham. It gives rise to the fallacy of "question-beg- 

 ging names." The very property which we are inquiring whether a thing 

 possesses or not, has become so associated with the name of the thing as to 

 be part of its meaning, insomuch that by merely uttering the name we as- 

 sume the point which was to be made out ; o^^e of the most frequent sources 

 of apparently self-evident propositions. 



Without any further multiplication of examples to illustrate the changes 

 which usage is continually making in the signification of terms, I shall add, 

 as a practical rule, that the logician, not being able to prevent such transfor- 

 mations, should submit to them with a good grace when they are iri-evocably 

 effected, and if a definition is necessary, define the word according to its new 

 meaning ; retaining the former as a second signification, if it is needed, and 

 if there is any chance of being able to preserve it either in the language of 

 philosophy or in common use. Logicians can not make the meaning of any 

 but scientific terms ; that of all other words is made by the collective hu- 

 man race. But logicians can ascertain clearly what it is which, working 

 obscurely, has guided the general mind to a particular employment of a 

 name; and when they have found this, they can clothe it in such' distinct 

 and permanent terms, that mankind shall see the meaning which before 

 they only felt, and shall not suffer it to be afterward forgotten or misappre- 

 hended. 



CHAPTER VI. 



THE PRIIfCIPLES OF A PfllLOSOPHICAL LANGUAGE FURTHER CONSIDERED. 



§ 1. We have, thus far, considered only one of the requisites of a lan- 

 guage adapted for the investigation of truth ; that its terms shall each of 

 them convey a determinate and unmistakable meaning. There are, howev- 

 er, as we have already remarked, other requisites ; some of them important 

 only in the second degree, but one which is fundamental, and barely yields 

 in point of importance, if it yields at all, to the quality which we have al- 

 ready discussed at so much length. That the language may be fitted for 

 its purposes, not only should every word perfectly express its meaning, but 

 there should be no important meaning without its word. Whatever we 

 have occasion to think of often, and for scientific purposes, ought to have 

 a name appropriated to it. 



This requisite of philosophical language may be considered under three 

 different heads ; that number of separate conditions being involved in it. 



§ 2. First, there ought to be all such names, as are needful for making 

 such a record of individual observations that the words of the record shall 

 exactly show what fact it is which has been observed. In other words, 

 there should be an accurate Descriptive Terminology. 



The only things which we can observe directly being our own sensations, 

 or other feelings, a complete descriptive language would be one in which 

 there should be a name for every variety of elementary sensation or feel- 



