516 FALLACIES. 



process of mind, by which a previous association has been estabUshed be- 

 tween them. Some pecuUarity of relation, however, there must be; the 

 fact which can, even by the wildest aberration, be supposed to prove an- 

 other fact, must stand in some special position with regard to it ; and if 

 we could ascertain and define that special position, we should perceive the 

 origin of the error. 



We can not regard one fact as evidentiary of another, unless we believe 

 that the two are always, or in the majority of cases, conjoined. If we be- 

 lieve A to be evidentiary of B, if when we see A we are inclined to infer 

 B from it, the reason is because we believe that wherever A is, B also ei- 

 ther always or for the most part exists, either as an antecedent, a conse- 

 quent, or a concomitant. If when we see A we are inclined not to expect 

 B — if we believe A to be evidentiary of the absence of B — it is because we 

 believe that where A is, B either is never, or at least seldom, found. Er- 

 roneous conclusions, in short, no less than correct conclusions, have an in- 

 variable relation to a general formula, either expressed or tacitly implied. 

 When we infer some fact from some other fact which does not really prove 

 it, we either have admitted, or, if we maintained consistency, ought to ad- 

 mit, some groundless general proposition respecting the conjunction of the 

 two phenomena. 



For every property, therefore, in facts, or in our mode of considering 

 facts, which leads us to believe that they are habitually conjoined when 

 they are not, or that they are not when in reality they are, there is a cor- 

 responding kind of Fallacy ; and an enumeration of fallacies would consist 

 in a specification of those properties in facts, and those peculiai-ities in our 

 mode of considering them, which give rise to this erroneous opinion. 



§ 2. To begin, then ; the supposed connection, or repugnance, between 

 the two facts, may either be a conclusion from evidence (that is, from some 

 other proposition or propositions), or may be admitted without any such 

 ground ; admitted, as the phrase is, on its own evidence ; embraced as self- 

 evident, as an axiomatic truth. This gives rise to the first great distinc- 

 tion, that between Fallacies of Inference and Fallacies of Simple Inspec- 

 tion. In the latter division must be included not only all cases in which 

 a proposition is believed and held for true, literally without any extrinsic 

 evidence, either of specific experience or general reasoning; but those 

 more frequent cases in which simple inspection creates a presumption in 

 favor of a proposition ; not sufficient for belief, but sufficient to cause the 

 strict principles of a regular induction to be dispensed with, and creating 

 a predisposition to believe it on evidence which would be seen to be in- 

 sufficient if no such presumption existed. This class, comprehending the 

 whole of what may be termed Natural Prejudices, and which I shall call 

 indiscriminately Fallacies of Simple Inspection or Fallacies a priori, shall 

 be placed at the head of our list. 



Fallacies of Inference, or erroneous conclusions from supposed evidence, 

 must be subdivided according to the nature of the apparent evidence from 

 which the conclusions are drawn; or (what is the same thing) according 

 to the particular kind of sound argument which the fallacy in question 

 simulates. But there is a distinction to be first drawn, which does not 

 answer to any of the divisions of sound arguments, but arises out of the 

 nature of bad ones. We may know exactly what our evidence is, and yet 

 draw a false conclusion from it; we may conceive precisely Avhat our 

 premises are, what alleged matters of fact, or general principles, are the 



