CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES. 519 



which is not true, ov else, one which does not prove the conclusion ; e. g., if 

 a man expatiates on the distress of the country, and thence argues that the 

 government is tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume either that ' ev- 

 ery distressed country is under a tyranny,' which is a manifest falsehood, 

 or merely that 'every country under a tyranny is distressed,' which, how- 

 ever true, proves nothing, the middle term being undistributed." The for- 

 mer would be ranked, in our distribution, among fallacies of generalization, 

 the latter among those of ratiocination. " Which are we to suppose the 

 speaker meant us to understand ? Surely " (if he understood himself) " just 

 whichever each of his hearers might happen to prefer : some might assent 

 to the false premise; others allow the unsound syllogism." 



Almost all fallacies, thei'efore, might in strictness be brought under our 

 fifth class. Fallacies of Confusion. A fallacy can seldom be absolutely re- 

 ferred to any of the other classes ; we can only say, that if all the links 

 were filled up which should be capable of being supplied in a valid argu- 

 ment, it would either stand thus (forming a fallacy of one class), or thus (a 

 fallacy of another) ; or at furthest we may say, that the conclusion is most 

 likely to have originated in a fallacy of such and such a class. Thus, in 

 the illustration just quoted, the error committed may be traced with most 

 probability to a fallacy of generalization ; that of mistaking an uncertain 

 mark, or piece of evidence, for a certain one ; concluding from an effect to 

 some one of its possible causes, when there are others which would have 

 been equally capable of producing it. 



Yet, though the five classes run into each other, and a particular error 

 often seems to be arbitrarily assigned to one of them rather than to any 

 of the rest, there is considerable use in so distinguishing them. We shall 

 find it convenient to set apart, as Fallacies of Confusion, those of which 

 confusion is the most obvious characteristic ; in which no other cause can 

 be assigned for the mistake committed, than neglect or inability to state 

 the question properly, and to apprehend the evidence with definiteness and 

 precision. In the remaining four classes I shall place not only the cases in 

 which 'the evidence is clearly seen to be what it is, and yet a wrong conclu- 

 sion drawn from it, but also those in which, although there be confusion, 

 the confusion is not the sole cause of the error, but there is some shadow 

 of a ground for it in the nature of the evidence itself. And in distribu- 

 ting these cases of partial confusion among the four classes, I shall, when 

 there can be any hesitation as to the precise seat of the fallacy, suppose it 

 to be in that part of the process in which, from the nature of the case, and 

 the tendencies of the human mind, an error would in the particular circum- 

 stances be the most probable. 



After these observations we shall proceed, without further preamble, to 

 consider the five classes in their order. 



