FALLACIES OF OBSERVATION. 539 



would be non-observation of instances ; but if we oveilooked or remained 

 ignorant of the fact that in cases where the predictions had been fulfilled, 

 he had been in collusion with some one who had given him the informa- 

 tion on which they were grounded, this would be non-observation of cir- 

 cumstances. 



The former case, in so far as the act of induction from insuflBcient evi- 

 dence is concerned, does not fall under this second class of Fallacies, but 

 under the third, Fallacies of Generalization. In every such case, however, 

 there are two defects or errors instead of one ; there is the error of treat- 

 ing the insufficient evidence as if it were sufficient, which is a Fallacy of 

 the third class; and there is the insufficiency itself; the not having better 

 evidence ; which, when such evidence, or, in other words, when other in- 

 stances, were to be had, is Non-observation ; and the erroneous inference, 

 so far as it is to be attributed to this cause, is a Fallacy of the second 

 class. 



It belongs not to our pui-pose to treat of non-observation as arising from 

 casual inattention, from general slovenliness of mental habits, want of due 

 practice in the use of the observing faculties, or insufficient interest in 

 the subject. The question pertinent to logic is — Granting the want of 

 complete competency in the observer, on what point is that insufficiency 

 on his part likely to lead him wrong ? or rather, what sorts of instances, 

 or of circumstances in any given instance, are most likely to escape the 

 notice of observers generally ; of mankind at large. 



§ 3. First, then, it is evident that when the instances on one side of a 

 question are more likely to be remembered and recorded than those on 

 the other ; especially if there be any strong motive to preserve the memory 

 of the first, but not of the latter ; these last are likely to be overlooked, 

 and escape the observation of the mass of mankind. This is the recog- 

 nized explanation of the credit given, in spite of reason and evidence, to 

 many classes of impostors; to quack-doctors, and fortune-tellers in all 

 ages ; to the " cunning man " of modern times, and the oracles of old. 

 Few have considered the extent to which this fallacy operates in practice, 

 even in the teeth of the most palpable negative evidence. A striking ex- 

 ample of it is the faith which the uneducated portion of the agricultural 

 classes, in this and other countries, continue to repose in the prophecies as 

 to weather supplied by almanac-makers ; though every season affords to 

 them numerous cases of completely erroneous prediction; but as every 

 season also furnishes some cases in which the prediction is fulfilled, this is 

 enough to keep up the credit of the prophet, with people who do not re- 

 flect on the number of instances requisite for what we have called, in our 

 inductive terminology, the Elimination of Chance ; since a certain number 

 of casual coincidences not only may but will happen, between any two un- 

 connected events. 



Coleridge, in one of the essays in the Friend, has illustrated the matter 

 we are now considering, in discussing, the origin of a proverb, "which, dif- 

 ferently worded, is to be found in all the languages of Europe," viz., " For- 

 tune favors fools." He ascribes it partly to the " tendency to exaggerate 

 all effects that seem disproportionate to their visible cause, and all circum- 

 stances that are in any way strongly contrasted with our notions of the 

 persons under them." ^ Omitting some explanations which would refer the 

 error to mal-observation, or to the other species of non-observation (that 

 of circumstances), I take up tlie quotation further on. " Unforeseen coinci- 



