we can do; 



d it, is very/ 

 re fatalists/ 



/ 



584 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



the ordinary sense of the term will adhere to it in spite of all we can do; 

 and though the doctrine of Necessity, as stated by most who hold 

 I'emote from fatalism, it is probable that most necessitarians ar 

 more or less, in their feelings. 



A fatalist believes, or half believes (for nobody is a consistent fatalist), 

 not only that whatever is about to happen will be the infallible result of 

 the causes which produce it (which is the true necessitarian doctrine), but 

 moreover that there is no use in struggling against it ; that it will hai^pen, 

 however we may strive to prevent it. Now, a necessitarian, believing that 

 our actions follow from our characters, and that our characters follow from 

 our organization, our education, aiM our circumstances, il apt to be, with 

 more or less of consciousness on his part, a fatalist as to his own actions, 

 and to believe that his nature is such, or* that his education and circum- 

 stances have so moulded his character, that nothing can now prevent him 

 from feeling and acting in a particular way, or at least that no effort of his 

 own can hinder it. In the words of the sect which in our own day has 

 most perseveringly inculcated and most perversely misunderstood this great 

 doctrine, his character is formed for him, and not hy him; thei'efore his 

 wishing that it had been formed differently is of no use ; he has no power 

 to alter it. But this is a grand error. He has, to a certain extent, a pow- 

 er to alter his character. Its being, in the ultimate resort, foi-med- for him, 

 is not inconsistent wittTits being, in part, formed hy him as one of the in 

 termediate agents. His character is formed by his circumstances (includ 

 ing among these his particular organization)..; but his own desire to moul 

 it in a particular way, is one of those circumstances, and by no mfiaiis .ona o: 

 the least influential. We can not, indeed,'directly will to be different fron: 

 what we are. But neither did those who ,are supposed to have formed our 

 characters directly will that we sfiould be what we are. Their will had no 

 direct power except over their own actions. They made us what they did 

 make us, by willing, not the end, but the requisite means ; and we, when 

 our habits are not too inveterate, can, by similarly willing the requisite 

 means, make ourselves different. If they could place us under the influence 

 of certain circumstances, we, in like manner, can place ourselves under the 

 influence of other circumstances. We are exactly as capable of makingi 

 our own character, if we will, as others are of making it for us. ][ 



Yes (answers the Owenite), but these words, " if we will," surrender the 

 whole point : since the will to alter our own character is given us, not by 

 any efforts of ours, but by circumstances which we can not help, it comes 

 to us either from external causes, or not at all. Most true: if tlie Owenite 

 stops here, he is in a position fi'om which nothing can expel him. Ourl 

 character is formed by us as well as for us ; but the wish which induces! 

 us to attempt to form it is formed for us; and how? Not, in general, by v 

 our organization, nor wholly by our education, but by nnr i^^gyipT^np ; ex- 

 perience of the painful consequences of the character we previously had ; 

 or by some strong feeling of admiration or' aspiration, accidentally aroused. 

 But to think that we have no power of altering our character, and to think 

 that we shall not use our power unless we desire to use it, are very differ- 

 ' ent things, and have a very different effect on the mind. A person who j 

 <loes not wish to alter his character, can not be the person who is supposed | 

 '*'''. to feel discouraged or paralyzed by thinking himself unable to do it. The 

 ^ depressing effect of the fatalist doctrine can only be felt where there is a 

 f wish to do what that doctrine represents as impossible. It is of no conse- f 

 \ quence what we think forms our character, when we have no desire of our 



