616 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



§ 3. Passing over less important instances, I shall come at once to the 

 most remarkable example afforded by our own times of the geometrical 

 method in politics; emanating from persons who are well aware of the 

 distinction between science and art ; who knew that rules of conduct must 

 follow, not precede, the ascertainment of laws of nature, and that the lat- 

 ter, not the foi-mer, is the legitimate field for the application of the deduct- 

 ive method. I allude to the interest-philosophy of the Benthara school. 



The profound and original thinkers who are commonly known under 

 this description, founded their general theory of government on one com- 

 prehensive premise, namely, that men's actions are always determined by 

 their interests. There is an ambiguity in this last expression ; for, as the 

 same philosophers, especially Bentham, gave the name of an interest to 

 anything which a person likes, the proposition may be understood to mean 

 only this, that men's actions are always determined by their wishes. In 

 this sense, however, it would not bear out any of the consequences which 

 these writers drevv from it ; and the word, therefore, in their political 

 reasonings, must be understood to mean (which is also the explanation they 

 themselves, on such occasions gave of it) what is commonly termed private, 

 or worldly, interest. 



Taking the doctrine, then, in this sense, an objection presents itself in 

 limine which might be deemed a fatal one, namely, that so sweeping a 

 proposition is far from being universally true. Human beings are not 

 governed in all their actions by their worldly interests. This, however, is 

 by no means so conclusive an objection as it at first appears ; because in 

 politics we are for the most part concerned with the conduct, not of indi- 

 vidual persons, but either of a series of persons (as a succession of kings), 

 or a body or mass of persons, as a nation, an aristocracy, or a representa- 

 tive assembly. And whatever is true of a large majority of mankind, may 

 without much error be taken for true of any succession of persons, con- 

 sidered as a whole, or of any collection of persons in which the act of the 

 majority becomes the act of the whole body. Although, therefore, the 

 maxim is sometimes expressed in a manner unnecessarily paradoxical, the 

 consequences drawn from it will hold equally good if the assertion be lim- 

 ited as follows: Any succession of persons, or the majority of any body 

 of persons, will be governed in the bulk of their conduct by their personal 

 interests. We are bound to allow to this school of thinkers the benefit of 

 this more rational statement of their fundamental maxim, which is also in 

 strict conformity to the explanations which, when considered to be called 

 for, have been given by themselves. 



The theory goes on to infer, quite correctly, that if the actions of man- 

 kind are determined in the main by their selfish interests, the only rulers 

 who will govern according to the interest of the governed, arc those whose 

 selfish interests are in accordance with it. And to this is added a third 

 proposition, namely, that no rulers have their selfish interest identical with 

 that of the governed, unless it be rendered so by accountability, that is, 

 by dependence on the will of the governed. In other words (and as the 

 result of the whole), that the desire of retaining or the fear of losing their 

 power, and whatever is thereon consequent, is the sole motive which can 

 be relied on for producing on the part of rulers a course of conduct in ac- 

 cordance with the general interest. 



We have thus a fundamental theorem of political science, consisting of 

 three syllogisms, and depending chiefly on two general premises, in each of 

 which a certain effect is considered as determined only by one cause, not 



