PHYSICAIi METHOD. 621 



in general, has attempted to characterize the Method of Sociology, M. 

 Comte, considers this inverse order as inseparably inherent in the nature of 

 sociological speculation. He looks upon the social science as essentially 

 consisting of generalizations from history, verified, not originally suggest- 

 ed, by deduction from the laws of human nature. Though there is a truth 

 contained in this opinion, of which I shall presently endeavor to show the 

 importance, I can not but think that this truth is enunciated in too unlim- 

 ited a manner, and that there is considerable scope in sociological inquiry 

 for the direct, as well as for the inverse. Deductive Method. 



It will, in fact, be shown in the next chapter, that there is a kind of soci- 

 ological inquiries to which, from their prodigious complication, the method 

 of direct deduction is altogether inapplicable, while by a happy compensa- 

 tion it is precisely in these cases that we are able to obtain the best empir- 

 ical laws : to these inquiries, therefore, the Inverse Method is exclusively 

 adapted. But there are also, as will presently appear, other cases in which 

 it is impossible to obtain from direct observation any thing worthy the 

 name of an empirical law; and it fortunately happens that these are the 

 very cases in which the Direct Method is least affected by the objection 

 which undoubtedly must always affect it in a certain degree. 



We shall begin, then, by looking at the Social Science as a science of di- 

 rect Deduction, and considering what can be accomplished in it, and under 

 what limitations, by that mode of investigation. We shall, then, in a sep- 

 arate chapter, examine and endeavor to characterize the inverse process. 



§ 2. It is evident, in the first place, that Sociology, considered as a sys- 

 tem of deductions a priori^ can not be a science of positive predictions, 

 but only of tendencies. We may be able to conclude, from the laws of hu- 

 man nature applied to the circumstances of a given state of society, that a 

 particular cause will operate in a certain manner unless counteracted ; but 

 w^e can never be assured to what extent or amount it will so operate, or 

 affirm with certainty that it will not be counteracted ; because we can sel- 

 dom know, even approximately, all the agencies which may co-exist with it, 

 and still less calculate the collective result of so many combined elements. 

 The remark, however, must here be once more repeated, that knowledge 

 insufficient for prediction may be most valuable for guidance. It is not 

 necessary for the wise conduct of the affairs of society, no more than of 

 any one's private concerns, that w^e should be able to foresee infallibly the 

 results of what we do. We. must seek our objects by means which may 

 perhaps be defeated, and take pi-ecautions against dangers which possibly 

 may never be realized. The aim of practical politics is to surround any 

 given society with the greatest possible number of circumstances of which 

 the tendencies are beneficial, and to remove or counteract, as far as practi- 

 cable, those of which the tendencies are injurious. A knowledge of the 

 tendencies only, though without the power of accurately predicting their 

 conjunct result, gives us to a considerable extent this power. 



It would, however, be an error to suppose that even with respect to tend- 

 encies we could arrive in this manner at any great number of proposi- 

 tions which will be true in all societies without exception. Such a suppo- 

 sition would be inconsistent with the eminently modifiable nature of the 

 social phenomena, and the multitude and variety of the circumstances by 

 which they are modified — circumstances never the same, or even^ 

 same, in two different societies, or in two different periods 

 society. This would not be so serious an obstacle if, thouj 



