LOGIC OF PRACTICE, OR ART. 653 



moral knowledge, and even (though improperly) under that of moral science, 

 an inquiry the results of which do not express themselves in the indica- 

 tive, but in the imperative mood, or in periphrases equivalent to it; what 

 is called the knowledge of duties; practical ethics, or morality. 



Now, the imperative mood is the characteiictic of art, as distinguished 

 from science. Whatever speaks in rules, or precepts, not in assertions re- 

 specting matters of fact, is art ; and ethics, or morality, is properly a por- 

 tion of the art corresponding to the sciences of human nature and society.* 



The Method, therefore, of Ethics, can be no other than that of Art, or 

 Practice, in general ; and the portion yet uncompleted of the task which 

 we proposed to ourselves in the concluding Book, is to characterize the gen- 

 eral Method of Art, as distinguished from Science. 



§ 2. In all branches of practical business there are cases in which indi- 

 viduals are bound to conform their practice to a pre-established rule, while 

 there are others in which it is part of their task to find or construct the 

 rule by which they are to govern their conduct. The first, for example, is 

 the case of a judge, under a definite written code. The judge is not called 

 upon to determine what course would be intrinsically the most advisable 

 in the particular case in hand, but only within what rule of law it falls ; 

 what the legislature has ordained to be done in the kind of case, and must 

 therefore be presumed to have intended in the individual case. The meth- 

 od must here be wholly and exclusively one of ratiocination, or syllogism ; 

 and the process is obviously, what in our analysis of the syllogism we 

 showed that all ratiocination is, namely the interpretation of a formula. 



In order that our illustration of the opposite case may be taken from the 

 same class of subjects as the former, we will suppose, in contrast with the 

 situation of the judge, the position of the legislator. As the judge has laws ^ 

 for his guidance, so' the legislator has rules, and maxims of policy ; but it 

 would be a manifest error to suppose that the legislator is bound by these 

 maxims in the same manner as the judge is bound by the laws, and that all 

 he has to do is to argue down from them to the particular case, as the judge 

 does from the laws. The legislator is bound to take into consideration the 

 reasons or grounds of the maxim; the judge has nothing to do with those 

 of the law, except so far as a consideration of them may throw light upon 

 the intention of the law-maker, where his words have left it doubtful. To 

 the judge, the rule, once positively ascertained, is final; but the legislator, 

 or other practitioner, who goes by rules rather than by their reasons, like 

 the old-fashioned German tacticians who were vanquished by Napoleon, 

 or the physician who preferred that his patients should die by rule rather 

 than recover contrary to it, is rightly judged to be a mere pedant, and the 

 slave of his formulas. 



Now, the reasons of a maxim of policy, or of any other rule of art, can 

 be no other than the theorems of the corresponding science. 



The relation in which rules of art stand to doctrines of science may be 

 thus characterized. The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, de- 

 fines the end, and hands it over to the science. The science receives it, con- 

 siders it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated 

 its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the coin- 



* It is almost superfluous to observe, that there is another meaning of the word Art, in 

 which it may be said to denote the poetical department or aspect of things in general, in con- 

 tradistinction to the scientific. In the text, the word is used in its older, and I hope, not yet 

 obsolete sense. 



