LOGIC OF PRACTICE, OR ART. 655 



actual circumstances of the case, or where we can not trust our judgment 

 in estiuiating them. But they do not at all supersede the i:)ropriety of go- 

 ing througli, when circumstances permit, the scientific process requisite 

 for framing a rule from the data of the particular case before us. At the 

 same time, the common rule may very properly serve as an admonition that 

 a certain mode of action has been found by ourselves and others to be well 

 adapted to the cases of most common occuri'ence ; so that if it be unsuita- 

 ble to the case in hand, the reason of its being so will be likely to arise 

 from some unusual circimistance. 



§ 4. The error is therefore apparent of those who would deduce the line 

 of conduct proper to particular cases from supposed universal practical 

 maxims, overlooking the necessity of constantly referring back to the prin- 

 ciples of the speculative science, in order to be sure of attaining even the 

 specific end which the rules have in view. How much greater still, then, 

 must the error be, of setting up such unbending principles, not merely as 

 universal rules for attaining a given end, but as rules of conduct generally, 

 without regard to the possibility, not only that some modifying cause may 

 prevent the attainment of the given end by the means which the rule pre- 

 scribes, but that success itself may conflict with some other end, which may 

 possibly chance to be more desirable. 



This is the liabitual error of many of the political speculators Avhom I 

 have characterized as the geometrical school ; especially in France, where 

 ratiocination from rules of practice forms the staple commodity of journal- 

 ism and political oratory — a misapprehension of the functions of Deduction 

 which has brought much discredit, in the estimation of other countries, 

 upon the spirit of generalization so honorably charactei'istic of the French 

 mind. The commonplaces of politics in France are large and sweeping 

 practical maxims, from which, as ultimate premises, men reason downward 

 to particular applications ; and this they call being logical and consistent. 

 For instance, they are perpetually arguing that such and such a measure 

 ought to be adopted, because it is a consequence of the principle on which 

 the form of government is founded; of the principle of legitimacy, or the 

 principle of the sovereignty of the people. To which it may be answered, 

 that if these be really practical principles, they must rest on speculative 

 grounds ; the sovereignty of the people, for example, must be a right foun- 

 dation for government, because a government thus constituted tends to pro- 

 duce certain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, however, as no government pro- 

 duces all possible beneficial effects, but all are attended with more or few- 

 er inconveniences, and since these can not usually be combated by means 

 drawn from the very causes which produce them, it Avould be often a much 

 stronger recommendation of some practical arrangement, that it does not 

 follow from Avhat is called the general principle of the government, than 

 that it does. Under a government of legitimacy, the presumption is far 

 rather in favor of institutions of popular origin ; and in a democracy, in 

 favor of arrangements tending to check the impetus of popular will. The 

 line of augmentation so commonly mistaken in France for political philoso- 

 phy, tends to the practical conclusion that we should exert our utmost ef- 

 forts to aggravate, instead of alleviating, whatever are the characteristic 

 imperfections of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under which 

 we happen to live. 



§ 5. The grounds, then, of every rule of art, are to be found in the the- 



