656 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



orenis of science. An art, or a body of art, consists of the* rules, together 

 with as much of the speculative propositions as comprises the justification 

 of those rules. The complete art of any matter includes a selection of 

 such a portion from the science as is necessary to show on what condi- 

 tions the effects, which the art aims at producing, depend. And Art in 

 general, consists of the truths of Science, arranged in the most convenient 

 order for practice, instead of the order which is the most convenient for 

 thought. Science groups and arranges its truths, so as to enable us to 

 take in at one view as much as possible of the general order of the uni- 

 verse. Art, though it must assume the same general laws, follows them 

 only into such of their detailed consequences as have led to the formation 

 of rules of conduct; and brings together from parts of the field of science 

 most remote from one another, tlie truths relating to the production of the 

 different and heterogeneous conditions necessary to each effect which the 

 exigencies of practical life require to be produced.* 



Science, therefore, following one cause to its various effects, while art 

 traces one effect to its multiplied and diversified causes and conditions, 

 there is need of a set of intermediate scientific truths, derived from the 

 higher generalities of science, and destined to serve as the generalia or 

 first principles of the various arts. The scientific operation of framing 

 these intermediate principles, M. Comte characterizes as one of those re- 

 sults of philosophy which are reserved for futurity. The only complete 

 example which he points out as actually realized, and which can be held 

 up as a type to be imitated in more important matters, is the general the- 

 ory of the art of Descriptive Geometry, as conceived by M. Monge. It is 

 not, however, difiicult to understand what the nature of these intermediate 

 principles must generally be. After framing the most comprehensive pos- 

 sible conception of the end to be aimed at, that is, of the effect to be pro- 

 duced, and determining in the same comprehensive manner the set of con- 

 ditions on which that effect depends, there remains to be laken, a general 

 survey of the resources which can be commanded for realizing this set of 

 conditions ; and when the result of this survey has been embodied in the 

 fewest and most extensive pi'opositions possible, those propositions will 

 express the general relation between the available means and the end, and 

 will constitute the general scientific theory of the art, from which its 

 practical methods will follow as corollaries. 



§ G. But though the reasonings which connect the end or purpose of ev- 

 ery art with its means belong to the domain of Science, the definition of 

 the end itself belongs exclusively to Art, and forms its peculiar province. 

 Every art has one first principle, or general major premise, not borrowed 

 from science; that which enunciates the object aimed at, and afiirms it to 

 be a desirable object. The builder's art assumes that it is desirable to 

 have buildings ; architecture, as one of the fine arts, that it is desirable 

 to have them beautiful or imposing. The hygienic and medical arts as- 

 sume, the one that the preservation of health, the other that the cure of 

 disease, are fitting and desirable ends. These are not propositions of sci- 

 ence. Propositions of science assert a matter of fact : an existence, a co- 

 existence, a successio*, or a resemblance. The propositions now spoken 

 of do not assert that any thing is, but enjoin or recommend that something 

 should be. They are a class by themselves. A proposition of which the 



* Professor Bain and others call the selection from the truths of science made for the pur- 

 poses of an art, a Practical Science, and confine the name Art to the actual rules. 



