LOGIC OF PRACTICE, OR ART. . 657 



predicate is expressed by the words ought or should he, \& generically dif- 

 ferent from one which is expressed by is, or will he. • It is true, that in the 

 largest sense of tlie words, even these propositions assert something as a 

 matter of fact. The fact affirmed in them is, that the conduct recommend- 

 ed excites in the speaker's mind the feeling of appi'obation. This, how- 

 ever, does not go to the bottom of the matter ; for the speaker's approba- 

 tion is no sufficient reason why other people should approve ; nor ought it 

 to be a conclusive reason even with himself. For the purposes of practice, 

 every one must be required to justify his approbation ; and for this there 

 is need of general premises, determining what are the proper objects of ap- 

 probation, and what the proper order of precedence among those objects. . 



These general premises, together with the principal conclusions which may 

 be deduced from them, form (or rather might form) a body of doctrine, 

 which is properly the Art of Life, in its three departments. Morality, Pru- 

 dence or Policy, and Esthetics ; the Right, the Expedient, and the Beau- 

 tiful or Noble, in human conduct and works. To this art (which, in the 

 main, is unfortunately still to be created), all other arts are subordinate ; 

 since its principles are those which must determine whether the special aim 

 of any particular art is worthy and desirable, and what is its place in the 

 scale of desirable things. Every art is thus a joint result of laws of nature 

 disclosed by science, and of the general principles of what has been called 

 Teleology, or the Doctrine of Ends ;* which, borrowing the language of the 

 German metaphysicians, may also be termed, not improperly, the principles 

 of Practical Reason. 



A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for 

 practice. His part is only to show that certain consequences follow from 

 certain causes, and that to obtain certain ends, certain means are the most ef- 

 fectual. Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and 

 if so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business 

 as a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him 

 for the decision. In i:)urely physical science, theVe is not much temptation 

 to assume this ulterior office; but those who treat of human nature and so- 

 ciety invariably claim it : they always undertake to say, not merely what 

 is, but what ought to be. To entitle them to do this, a complete doctrine 

 of Teleology is indispensable. A scientific theory, however perfect, of the 

 subject-matter, considered merely as part of the order of nature, can in no 

 degree serve as a substitute. In this respect the various subordinate arts 

 afford a misleading analogy. In them there is seldom any visible necessity 

 for justifying the end, since in general its desirableness is denied by nobody, 

 and it is only when the question of precedence is to be decided between 

 that end and some other, that the general principles of Teleology have to 

 be called in ; but a writer on Morals and Politics requires those principles 

 at every step. The most elaborate and well - digested exposition of the 

 laws of succession and co-existence among mental or social phenomena, and 

 of their relation to one another as causes and effects, will be of no avail 

 toward the art of Life or of Society, if the ends to be aimed at by that art 

 are left to the vague suggestions of the intellectus slbi 2^ermissus, or are 

 taken for gi*anted without analysis or questioning. 



§ 7. There is, then, a philosophia prima peculiar to Art, as there is one 

 which belongs to Science. There are not only first principles of Knowl- 



* The word Teleology is also, but inconveniently and improperly, employed by some writers 

 as a name for the attempt to explain the phenomena of the universe from final causes. 



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