658 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



edge, but first principles of Conduct, There must be some standard by 

 which to determine the goodness or badness, absolute and comparative, of 

 ends, or objects of desire. And whatever that standard is, there can be but 

 one ; for if there were several ultimate principles of conduct, the same con- 

 duct might be approved by one of those principles and condemned by an- 

 other ; and there would be needed some more general principle, as umpire 

 between them. 



Accordingly, writers on Moral Philosophy have mostly felt the necessity 

 not only of referring all rules of conduct, and all judgments of praise and 

 blame, to principles, but of referring them to some one principle ; some 

 rule, or standard, with which all other rules of conduct were required to be 

 consistent, and from which by ultimate consequence they could all be de- 

 duced. Those who have dispensed with the assumption of such a universal 

 standard, have only been enabled to do so by supposmg that a moral sense, 

 or instinct, inherent in our constitution, informs us, both what princijjles of 

 conduct we are bound to observe, and also in what order these should be 

 subordinated to one another. 



The theory of the foundations of morality is a subject which it would be 

 out of place, in a work like this, to discuss at large, and which could not to 

 any useful purpose be treated incidentally. I shall content myself, therefore, 

 with saying, that the doctrine of intuitive moral principles, even if true, 

 would provide only for that portion of the field of conduct which is prop- 

 erly called moral. For the remainder of the practice of life some general 

 principle, or standard, must still be sought ; and if that principle be rightly 

 chosen, it will be found, I apprehend, to serve quite as well for the ultimate 

 principle of Morality, as for that of Prudence, Policy, or Taste. 



Without attempting in this place to justify my opinion, or even to define 

 the kind of justification which it admits of, I merely declare my conviction, 

 that the general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, 

 and the test by which they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the 

 happiness of mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings ; in other words, that 

 the promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of Teleology.* 



I do not mean to assert that the promotion of happiness should be itself 

 the end of all actions, or even of all rules of action. It is the justification, 

 and ought to be the controller, of all ends, but it is not itself the sole end. 

 There are many virtuous actions, and even virtuous modes of action (though 

 the cases are, I think, less frequent than is often supposed), by which hap- 

 piness in the particular instance is sacrificed, more pain being produced 

 than pleasure. But conduct of Avhich this can be truly asserted, admits of 

 justification only because it can be shown that, on the whole, more happiness 

 will exist in the world, if feelings are cultivated which will make people, in 

 certain cases, regardless of happiness. I fully admit that this is true; that 

 the cultivation of an ideal nobleness of will and conduct should be to indi- 

 vidual human beings an end, to which the specific pursuit either of their 

 own happiness or of that of others (except so far as included in-that idea) 

 should, in any case of confiict, give way. But I hold that the very ques- 

 tion, what constitutes this elevation of character, is itself to be decided by 

 a reference to happiness as the standard. The character itself should be, 

 to the individual, a paramount end, simply because the existence of this 

 ideal nobleness of character, or of a near approach to it, in any abundance, 

 would go farther than all things else toward making human life happy, 



* For an express discussion and vindication of this principle, see the little volume entitled 

 "Utilitarianism." 



