SEMBLANCE OF WISDOM. 43 



utter oblivion, out of which not even the ghost of the 

 departed day can return to torment us into the 

 chance of amendment. If we would have the credit 

 of being thought thinkers (for the course that we 

 pursue is any thing but that which will lead us to 

 the reality), we must " look wise," and turn up our 

 eyes, and shut our ears, and, as it were, barricade 

 ourselves against every possible intrusion of the 

 external world. It is true that there is no direct 

 harm in a man's looking as wise as ever he pleases, 

 if so be his fancy though looking wise is proverbially 

 not one of the signs of being wise ; but it is also true 

 that men who always closet themselves for abstruse 

 thinking, not only incapacitate themselves for active 

 life, but defeat the very object they have in viw. 

 They become moping and absent; and, following 

 their own particular study into holes and corners out 

 of its connexion and use, they get narrow and con- 

 ceited views of it, and not only make it repulsive to 

 the more active part of the world, but actually advance 

 it less than they would do if they treated it in a more 

 popular manner, and blended their thinking with 

 more of observation. 



It is true that observation and thought cannot go 

 equally together on all subjects of which even the 

 plainest man may have occasion to think. Observa- 

 tion is chained to matter limited in time and in 

 space ; and, in all respects, thought is free. So that 

 any man's personal observation is the foundation of 

 only a very limited portion of that which he learns. 

 But still it is the test by which he tries the reality 

 of the whole ; and the only test by which he can try 

 whether each part be true, and deserve the name of 

 knowledge. That being the case, though we cannot 

 extend our personal observation to every thing, the 

 more extensive that we can make it, always the 

 better. Truth the agreement of the relation with 

 the nature of the subjects to which we apply it, can 

 be ascertained only by observing the fact that it is 

 so : and, therefore^ by having the test of observation 



