PLEASURE OF IMAGINATION. 59 



eluding, that that is not the act of sight, but that 

 there is something mental consequent upon it, far 

 more nice and curious than any thing which mate- 

 rial eyes can discriminate. And we have proof of it, 

 in those pictured scenes which, sleeping or waking, 

 arise to the imagination, far different from any frtwg 

 that the eyes ever beheld, and yet equally bright and 

 perfect in the colouring. But those imagined views 

 are, in truth, all made up of that which has been 

 seen, or otherwise perceived by the senses; and, 

 therefore, though, after observation has given us the 

 materials, we can, by the operation of our minds, 

 work it into endless forms and combinations of de- 

 light, we must obtain the materials originally from 

 observation. Nor must we forget to bear in mind, 

 that the case is here the same as it is everywhere 

 else ; we cannot " gather grapes of thorns, or figs 

 of thistles ;" we cannot build palaces of marble, if 

 we have observed only mud and rushes. If our ob- 

 servation has been narrow, our imaginings must be 

 meager; and if our observation has been vulgar, 

 they must be mean. 



The formation of those imagined works is perhaps 

 the very highest pleasure we can enjoy, and it is the 

 foundation of all that we invent and the greater part 

 of what we do. If, therefore, we do not, by obser- 

 vation, find the mind sufficient materials whereon it 

 may work, and out of which it may elaborate valua- 

 ble or splendid combinations, we chain ourselves 

 down, and are humble beings in the estimation of 

 our neighbours, and wretched in our own feelings : 

 we not only cut ourselves off from a vast volume of 

 enjoyment ; but we blight and wither our very 

 powers of enjoying. 



The ennui that comes upon us when we have 

 been long idle and listless, and the revery and obli- 

 vion which are consequent upon excess of mere 

 thought, without the exercise and use of the senses, 

 are proofs of the pleasure that we do derive, and 



