FRANCIS BACON. 129 



almost dined on them, and was so ill that I was in great danger/ This 

 is the comparentia instantiarum sccimdum magis et minus. ( It cannot 

 have been the brandy which I took with them, for I have drunk brandy 

 daily for years without being the worse for it.' This is the rejectio na- 

 turarum. Our invalid then proceeds to what is termed by Bacon the 

 Vindemiatio, and pronounces that minced pies do not agree with him." 



Bacon, however, was certainly the first to analyse the inductive 

 methods of reasoning with minuteness and accuracy, to bring into 

 the form^ojLa^ciaigd^sysJem those principles which, though they 

 had beenTadopted in practice, had never before been viewed in their 

 mutual relation and dependence. It is no detraction from the merit 

 of Bacon's work that no succeeding philosopher perhaps ever expressly 

 marshalled his facts under the heads of instantiat, prerogatives, etc. 

 The value of a grammar of a language is not lessened by the fact 

 that its rules are never quoted by the writer of the language. A system 

 of rhetoric may possess the highest excellence, although there may be 

 many an able orator altogether unconscious of the contents or exist- 

 ence of any analysis of his art. Bacon doubtless set too high a value 

 upon his rules when he supposed that a mere acquaintance with them 

 would certainly guide a person, otherwise unpossessed of the genius 

 for scientific discovery, to the knowledge of new truths. Indeed, he 

 altogether failed himself to make any discovery, although as an illus- 

 tration of his methods he applied his rules to the results of many ex- 

 periments he made on heat and cold. This is not to be wondered at, 

 if we consider the dearth of sufficient data in facts and experiments. 

 At that time, for instance, the thermometer had not come into use, 

 and it was in fact nearly a century afterwards before this instrument 

 was graduated and made a comparable measure of temperatures. But 

 it is surprising that Bacon should have failed to recognize the best 

 inductive labours of his own time ; for he rejected the Copernican 

 theory, and refused to acknowledge the discoveries of Gilbert 



The true service which Bacon rendered to science consisted not 

 only in the completeness of his analysis of the inductive reasoning, 

 but more particularly in his clear recognition and weighty declaration 

 of the principle that induction is the only basis upon which scientific 

 truths ca.fi rest, and that all who desire to arrive at useful discoveries 

 must travel by that road. " He was not the maker of that road ; he 

 was not the discoverer of that road ; he was not the person who first 

 surveyed and mapped that road. But he was the person who first 

 called the public attention to an inexhaustible mine of wealth which 

 had been utterly neglected, and which was accessible by that road 

 alone." The ancient philosophers and their successors could dispense 

 with induction, or afford to use it carelessly, because their speculations 

 were never brought to the test of a comparison with fact. The objects 

 they had in view did not lead them to seek for any verification of their 

 doctrines in the world around them. They pursued science as a purely 



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