66o HISTORY OF SCIENCE. 



some been attributed to their neglect of observation, by some to their 

 not employing inductive reasoning, by others to their want of " distinct 

 ideas " or of " appropriate scientific conceptions." It would seem, 

 however, that facts of nature must have surrounded them as they sur- 

 round us, and certainly the Greeks were far from being an unobservant 

 race, while induction as a process of reasoning is simply the process 

 of every-day life; and, indeed, the proceeding from particular to general 

 truths was recognized by the Greeks as an important logical method. 

 Nor, after glancing at the speculations which have been alluded to in 

 our first chapter, will the reader be disposed to admit that the Greeks 

 can be justly charged with a poverty of ideas, or with a want of distinct 

 ideas. Yet according to the view of a late distinguished writer on the 

 history and philosophy of science, it was the want of " distinctness " 

 in the ideas of these Greek philosophers which caused their failure in 

 physical science. But the same author still more strongly insists upon 

 the " inappropriateness " of the ancient ideas as the barrier to any real 

 progress in science. This phrase is, however, only another mode of 

 expressing the fact of the failure, and is not an explanation of the cause. 

 The truth appears to be that the ancient Greek philosophers eagerly 

 grasped at generalization, suggested indeed by observation, but un- 

 supported by the slow and laborious processes of experimental verifi- 

 cation; and they applied these generalities as universal principles, 

 satisfied with any conclusions which might by mental operations 

 alone be clearly deduced. They trusted to merely verbal representa- 

 tions, instead of keeping in view the facts themselves, and they did 

 not understand the importance of that part of the inductive process 

 which is now so carefully performed, namely, verification. It is only 

 by verification at every stage that induction proceeds safely. There 

 must be verification of the facts and of the conclusions at each step 

 of their ascending scale of generality. The art of scientific observation 

 and discovery had, in fact, to be developed, and, like other arts, its 

 growth was slow. But though there is none, or next to none, of the 

 science of the ancient Greeks embodied in the sciences as they now 

 exist, it must not be supposed that their efforts have done no service 

 to the inductive sciences. They showed at least what were the best 

 solutions that could be yielded by their method of attacking the pro- 

 blems of nature, carried out as it was under the most favourable 

 conditions of intellectual power. 



In the Alexandrian school we find observation and experiment in 

 some measure taking the place of speculations as to what would happen 

 according to certain assumed principles. Results of permanent value 

 were thereupon attained, and still possess a place in our sciences. 

 Such, for instance, are the "principle of Archimedes" (page 41) and 

 some of his propositions concerning the centre of gravity, and in 

 statics and dynamics. These form a contrast to Aristotle's specula- 

 tions on mechanical subjects. It is not improbable that had the 



