nature. It must preserve itself, it must perpetuate its 

 kind, and, if it be a member of a higher community, it 

 must act in the interests of others and of the whole group. 

 Do we not find, then, biological definitions of right, and 

 evil, and duty to others as well as to self? Do we not see 

 why altruism has grown out of egoism as communities 

 have evolved at the behest of nature? 



But still, facts like these are purely zoological facts. To 

 be well within his rights, the zoologist should perhaps only 

 suggest their usefulness for the analysis of human social 

 relations and obligations. It is for the sociologist and the 

 student of comparative ethics to employ and apply them 

 according to the principles of the genetic method, should 

 they see fit to do so. 



IN closing, may I say a few words regarding the attitude 

 of the zoologist toward his problems and his results. He 

 may maintain this attitude because of a certain tempera- 

 ment which leads him and his fellows to enter the field of 

 science as investigators. While this may be true, it is also 

 true, I believe, that the subjects of their study, the prin- 

 ciples they may discern in nature's order, and their meth- 

 ods of analysis have a profound reflex effect upon not only 

 the contents of their minds but upon their mental ma- 

 chinery as well. The zoologist, like his fellow men of 

 science, learns early that he must adopt an impersonal atti- 

 tude, for emotion and purely human interest are disturb- 

 ing elements that prevent him from attaining the purpose 

 of the investigator which is, to ascertain and verify facts, 

 to classify them logically, so as to derive from them the 

 summaries which like so much "conceptual short-hand" are 

 available for others as well as himself. Science is "organ- 

 ized knowledge," as Pearson defines it; "organized common 

 sense" in Huxley's phrase ; and like other men of science the 



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