ADAM SMITH. 123 



and the second involves both a petitio principii and a 

 dangerous doctrine. It cannot surely be doubted that a 

 sense of right may exist in the mind, a disposition to pro- 

 nounce a thing fit and proper, innocent or praiseworthy, 

 unfit or unbecoming, guilty or blameworthy, without the 

 least regard either to the feelings or the judgments of 

 other men. It is quite certain, that, in point of fact, we 

 feel this sentiment of approbation or disapprobation 

 without being in the least degree sensible of making any 

 reference to other men's feelings, and no sympathy with 

 them is interposed between our own sentence of approval 

 or disapproval and its object. But it is enough to say, 

 and it seems to answer the theory at once, that even if 

 our sympathy were admitted to be the foundation of our 

 approval, our inability to sympathise the ground of our 

 disapproval, this in no way explains why we should 

 approve because of the accord and disapprove because 

 of the discord. 



The theory, with the utmost concession that can be 

 made to it as to the ground-work, leaves the superstruc- 

 ture still defective, and defective in the same degree 

 in which the ' Theory of Utility ' is defective ; we are 

 still left to seek for a reason why approval follows the 

 perception of corresponding feelings in the one case, of 

 general utility in the other. Dr. Paley is so sensible 

 of this, that after resolving all questions of morals into 

 questions of utility, he is obliged to call in the Divine 

 Will as the ground of our doing or approving that which 

 is found to be generally useful. Other reasoners on the 

 same side of the question pass over the defect of their 

 system altogether, while some try the question by assum- 

 ing that we must desire or approve that which is useful ; 



