MORTAL AND VENIAL SINS 25 



b) The fact that every sin implies a disturb- 

 ance of the moral order does not suffice to estab- 

 lish an essential distinction between mortal and 

 venial sins. For this distinction is not (or, at 

 least, not entirely) based on the objective 

 consequences of sin (materia gravis et levis), 

 i. e., the greater or less degree in which the 

 moral order is disturbed, but primarily on the sub- 

 jective tendency of the will. "The external ob- 

 ject," says a modern theologian, "is merely the 

 proximate aim and motive. The ultimate cause 

 of sin is the ego, the gratification of self-love, 

 that inordinate seeking of one's own interest 

 which is directly opposed to the love of God. 

 This is true of all sins, even of those whose object 

 lies outside the sinner's own person (infidelity, 

 despair, presumption)." 27 



Hence, broadly speaking, it may be said that 

 whatever is done out of malice is mortally sinful, 

 whereas that which has infirmity for its motive is 

 merely a venial sin, though, strictly speaking, 

 there are sins of malice that are venial and sins 

 of infirmity that are mortal. No man is able to 

 fathom the secret motives of his fellow-men, and 

 consequently God alone can tell with absolute cer- 

 tainty how much malice has gone into any sin. 28 



27 H. Gerigk, Wesen und Vor- eventu, sed vitiis hominum metienda 



aussetzungen der Todsiinde, p. 116. sunt." 



— Cfr. Cicero, Parad., Ill, i: 28 Cfr. Jer. XVII, 10; i Cor. IV, 



"Parva, inquis, res est; at magna 4; 2 Thess. II, 7; Deut. XVII, 8. 

 culpa. Nee enitn peccata rerum 



