REVIEW OF THE MODERN" DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION". 239 



rives our instincts from an ancestry whose daily occupation has 

 been their gratification. But it has been shown above that this 

 development does not supply the motives of an independent 

 morality.* 



The direction of action under stimulus is determined by intel- 

 ligence, which is, as has been above maintained, the product of 

 experience. Intelligence is organized or classified knowledge, and 

 directs the activities set on foot by the likes and dislikes, that is, 

 the affections. When there is hiioivledge, tliere is no necessity for 

 spontcmeous action or free will, since action is determined by the 

 organization of the mind. Even if the mind is conscious of insuf- 

 ficient knowledge, an inducement to seek knowledge is supplied, 

 and according to the result of investigation will be the direction 

 of knowledge. 



But we are here brought to face the case where knowledge can 

 not be or is not obtained. This is the condition of the two ques- 

 tions of the practice of morals, and the nature of the future life. 

 The evolution of mind consists of a continual advance from the 

 known into the unknown, and a transfer of the unknown to the 

 known. So long as there is any inducement to progress of this 

 kind, and nature responds to inquiry, development will go on. Al- 

 though it is true that it is only among men, and but few men at 

 that, that the pursuit of knowledge is an occupation, most men 

 add to their stock incidentally as they pursue other avocations. 

 The knowledge of right and the inducements to its practice are 

 learned in their every-day intercourse, so far as it can be acquired. 

 But knowledge in these directions soon attains its limit, and ac- 

 cordingly, development dependent on knowledge must cease. If 

 any further progress in practical morals is to be made, some new 

 force must intervene at this point. 



Here is the opportunity for the appearance of will or sponta- 

 neity ; here it is at least needed. I am willing to believe that it 

 may appear at this point, and that so long as we have to face the 

 unknown in moral progress, so long it will remain. As a force 

 it must be equivalent of other forces, but as a form of conscious- 

 ness it is a new element of mind. As represented in new molecu- 

 lar organization, it may always continue, even after much of the 

 unknown may have been conquered, and a stationary period may 

 have ensued. Such an accession to character would be a fitting 



* " On the Origin of the Will." " Penn Monthly," \B,11. 



