THE ORIGIN OF THE WILL. 439 



II. THE NATURE OF ACTIONS. 



The discussion between the advocates of the freedom of the will 

 on the one hand, and those of the doctrine of necessity on the 

 other, has often been obstructed by a petitio principii, which 

 yields the case to the latter side at the outset. This is the dictum 

 which has often passed unchallenged by both parties, that " human 

 action is the product of the strongest inducement," or, otherwise 

 stated, that "the will is the result of a balancing of opposing 

 motives," or that "the will obeys the strongest motive." This is 

 simply the statement, in reversed order, of what we might suppose 

 without examination to be a general truth, viz. : that the motives 

 which precede the acts which we observe are stronger than all 

 others at the time. If this proposition be true without qualifica- 

 tion, there is no further need of discussion, since it involves the 

 negation of freedom, or of a power of choosing. But as such, it 

 is an assumption in advance of a conclusion in the case under con- 

 sideration ; a begging of the question in a clear sense. Such a 

 position can only be adopted as a result of the fullest investigation 

 into the phenomena ; it can not be accorded before examination 

 into the facts. 



But the statement may be admitted with this important qualifi- 

 cation, by which the argument is transferred to another stage of 

 the subject, viz. : that we do not thereby explain why the induce- 

 ments to act thus and so, do, in many obvious cases, overbalance 

 all others in a given human mind. This inquiry is not fruitless, 

 so long as we have before us every day examples of men acting 

 differently under identical circumstances. If there be any " lib- 

 erty," it is exercised at the point of permitting inducements or 

 motives of one kind to occupy the mind to the exclusion of those 

 of another kind ; and secondly, such occupation being granted, 

 freedom might be exercised in removing restraint from the press- 

 ure of the present motive, so that the act can take place. If there 

 be no inherent power of controlling the attention, and none of 

 restraining the pressure of motive, then there is no will in any 

 proper sense of the word, and man is an irresponsible automaton. 

 The proof or disproof of this proposition must, however, be the end, 

 not the beginning, of the discussion. 



An inquiry into the origin of actions must be preceded by an 

 examination into the nature of the acts themselves. The follow- 

 ing classification is offered, as expressing as nearly as possible their 



