444: METAPHYSICAL EVOLUTION. 



There are three primary conditions of consciousness, which 

 naturally grade into each other, viz.: pain, indifference, and 

 pleasure. Consciousness is of one or the other of these types in 

 all animals. The constant flow of activity, either in movements 

 of the whole body or of particular parts of the body, has brought 

 animals from their beginning into contact with other bodies, 

 either at rest, or animated by active forces, as light and heat, 

 which have varied their sensations, rendering them more positive 

 in each of the three directions named. These sensations soon 

 cease, leaving consciousness where it was, but not without marks 

 of their former presence in the organism. They are recorded, 

 and continue in unconsciousness so long as the organism remains 

 unchanged. This is the first part of memory, i. e., retention. 

 Under the influence of what is called cohesion, the impressions 

 may be returned to consciousness in a less distinct form by the 

 occurrence of new impressions which have some near relation 

 with them as to time, place, or qualities of other kinds. This is 

 the second part of memory, or reminiscence. The sum of the 

 impressions which are necessar}^ to memory constitutes experi- 

 ence. It is evident that reminiscence is pleasurable or painful, 

 as the experiences recalled were pleasurable or painful. Another 

 quality is rendered possible by the two faculties of retention and 

 cohesion, viz.: classification. This consists of a re-arrangement 

 of retained impressions in accordance with different kinds of co- 

 hesions, i. e., different kinds of likenesses. The products of 

 classification may be brought into consciousness just as sensible 

 impressions are revived ; but unlike these, they constitute in their 

 totality a new experience of internal origin. When a cohesion 

 between two circumstances is due to a repeated experience of the 

 one as following the other, men entertain the idea that one is 

 necessary to the other. From memory of the necessary results 

 of our own activity, we have come to regard necessary sequences 

 as the result of activity somewhere. If activity be discerned in 

 the first of two coherent events, we regard it as a cause of the 

 second : if the first be passive, the idea of cause does not arise in 

 connection with it, but in some other active agent. Finally, all 

 processes involving reminiscences are less distinct than the original 

 impressions. Spencer calls the former /a m^, the ]a,ttev distinct ; 

 the faint order are the processes of reason ; the distinct, of per- 

 ception. 



Whether these processes are pleasurable, painful, or indifferent, 



