THE ORIGIN" OF THE WILL. 453 



portion to certainty, or supposed certainty, in affairs, is faith 

 diminished in its scope. 



It is evident then that, abstractly speaking, occasions must 

 arise in human experience where a decision between two alterna- 

 tives is dejiendent on choice alone. That these occasions have 

 arisen, and the choice been made, is shown by the existence of the 

 altruistic class of actions. The number of these occasions may 

 not be very great, but the consequences are very important. In 

 wliatever direction these decisions are made, long series of auto- 

 matic actions are organised. 



Although the existence of the altruistic class of acts affords the 

 clearest proof of the origin of will, it is not denied that corre- 

 sponding situations may not occur in other directions. It is also 

 probable .that will, once organized as a faculty of consciouness, 

 can be exercised in many acts in opposition to habits, differing in 

 accordance with the constitution of the individual ; and that it 

 can be inherited like any other quality of mind. But I will show 

 later, that the organization of altruistic habits has narrower limits 

 than that of those of the appetent class, because self-i)reservation 

 depends on the latter, and not on the former, so that the appe- 

 tent qualities are more certain to be inherited and survive. 



The conclusion of this. j)ortion of the subject is, that that de- 

 l^artment of mind called the feelings * is the primary source of 

 action ; that they act automatically, with or without the aid of the 

 reasoning powers, when dealing with the known ; but when deal- 

 ing with the unknown may develop, in self-conscious beings, the 

 state of faith and acts of will ; that this freedom is born of ten- 

 sion of the affections and of inability of the intellect. 



Thus have the irregular and fortuitous decisions of animals 

 been replaced by volition, as the highest quality of the mind, and 

 therefore the crown of evolution. No new *' physical'' force is 

 here called into requisition. The determination of the direction 

 of such forces already existing in or passing through the brain in 

 executive action need not add to nor substract from them. Will is, 

 under these circumstances, looked upon as developed consciousness. 



All this is, of course, opposed by the doctrine of the origin of 

 moral excellence by development, on the basis of the utilitarian 

 theory of morals. I therefore proceed to a brief examination of 

 its claims in this direction. 



* Wliich appears to be identical with what Schopenhauer calls the will. 



