456 METAPHYSICAL EVOLUTION. 



does not come into existence, or is extinguished, so far as regards 

 those affections. In such a situation there is no such equivalency 

 between opj)osing motives as gives opportunity for the will, the 

 experience of appetent pleasure being too strong to allow of hesi- 

 tancy in the face of vague representations of imaginary conse- 

 quences on the other side. Even in highly intelligent men, to 

 whom consequences are best known, knowledge may be thrust 

 from consciousness, by strong feeling in favor of one alternative 

 at the moment of action. 



VII. CONSEQUENCES. 



It is now well to consider how far an. automatic mind has any 

 claim to personality or individuality, as generally understood. 

 From the usual stand-point, a being without 'Miberty," or will 

 properly so called, is without character, and is in so far a nonen- 

 tity. Even the character of the Deity can not escape this de- 

 structive analysis ; for according to Spinoza, if He is good, but a 

 single line of action, without alternatives, lies open to God, if He 

 be at the same time omniscient. All this is changed if the ele- 

 ment of spontaneity in character be presupposed. The existence 

 of such a quality in man renders foresight of its decisions in some 

 cases no more than a calculation of chances, and in other cases 

 impossible ; thus offering the only conceivable limit to omnis- 

 cience, and hence to omnijootence. And as we regard the good- 

 ness of God as the anchor of the universe, if that goodness be in 

 some respect inconsistent with omnipotence, we are strengthened 

 if we discover that there is ground for correcting our traditional 

 suppositions in regard to the latter. Can we not find this ground 

 in a liberty or freedom which is the condition of what we suppose, 

 in the absence of knowledge, to be the characteristic of the highest 

 class of conscious existences ? 



Note. — Another explanation of this conehision of Spinoza's, quite apart from 

 the question of human freedom, is to be found in some of the necessary properties 

 of matter. The old theologians expressed this point obscurely in their phrase, " the 

 intractability of matter." (Ed. 1886.) 



Second Note. (EJ. 1886.) — The preceding essay was written several years 

 prior to that on Catagenesis. In the latter article a mental quality was referred to 

 as present in all animals, which constitutes " the will " of various writers, although 

 it is not free. It is described in the following passage : " Why, from a purely me- 

 chanical point of view, is the adductor muscle of the right side of the horse's tail con- 

 tracted to brush away the stinging fly from the right side of the horse's body, rather 

 than the left adductor muscle ? Why was the contraction-provoking energy deflected 



