670 Dynamic Theory. 



mer is recognized, so, that the terms remembrance, recollection, &c. , are 

 taken to signify states of consciousness. I have used the word remem- 

 brance, above, to signify the renewal of a former activity of cells, re- 

 gardless of whether such activity is followed by consciousness of it or 

 not. To avoid coining a new word, recollection may be used to signify 

 an activity of memory of which we are conscious. By this use, a recol- 

 lection is the (conscious) sensation of a remembrance. To illustrate: 

 light is a sensation of sight ; recollection is a renewal of the same sen- 

 sation in reduced intensity. Both are states of consciousness, but 

 neither of them is essentially a cause or a necessary link in brain dif- 

 ferentiation or restimulation. When they occur they are effects, light 

 arising from sensory impression, and recollection from remembrance, or 

 cell restimulation, occurring when such impression or remembrance 

 reaches a certain degree of intensity. 



The cerebral cells, whose remembrance is liable to overflow to other 

 cells and restimulate them, are called organs of the internal senses, their 

 relationship to the other cells being similar to that of external organs of 

 sense. If, when a cerebral act is performed or suffered it is not done 

 consciously, it is not remembered, probably because an intensity of ac- 

 tion strong enough to differentiate and stamp a character upon the cell 

 is also sufficient to arouse sensation, while if it cannot arouse sensation 

 it is not strong enough to differentiate the cell. There are many partial 

 differentiations caused by faint sensory impressions, that are without 

 permanent effect, the cell relapsing to its former state. No memory fol- 

 lows these impressions, and yet a large number of actions are performed 

 under them, especially those which are habitual. Thus, a man in the 

 habit of winding his watch at a certain hour, will finally come to do so 

 almost unconsciously, so that an hour later he will be unable to say 

 whether he has wound it or not, and will try to do it again. Thus, the 

 same impression made in a state of inattention, or reduced conscious- 

 ness, is not sufficient to make a permanent alteration in the cell so as to 

 establish a memory, nor does it arouse a full-grown sensation of itself. 

 But we must remember that the state of attention is altogether due to 

 the (relative) force of the impression. If the stimulus remains uni- 

 form, as in the above example, it comes to have relatively less and less 

 power to arouse attention and sensation, because, as we shall see, sensa- 

 tion follows, and is due to the friction of the resistance of the nerves 

 and cells against the current energy ; the amount of the friction indi- 

 cates the wear and tear, and that determines the amount of blood sup- 

 plied to repair the cells, and attention is simply our sensation of the in- 

 crease of the blood supply. Long repeated habit reduces the friction ; 

 and the reduction of the sensation of the impression, of wear and tear, 

 of blood supply, and of attention, immediately follow. . At the same 



