718 Dynamic Theory. 



CHAPTER LXVIII. 



CONSCIENCE, AND THE MORAL SENSE. 



If all sensations were neutral in their character, that is, neither pleas- 

 urable nor painful in the least degree, they would lose their distinctive 

 quality of sensations, and be reduced to sensory impressions. As sen- 

 sory impressions, they are links in a series of motion, which, begin- 

 ning as an external stimulation, passes through the sense organ and 

 ends in reflex or automatic muscular movement. We usually attribute 

 such automatic action to the ganglionic centers below the cerebrum. 

 But if there be neutral sensations, that is, sensations which amount 

 only to a passive negative sort of consciousness of the sense impression, 

 they may contribute to a reflex action of the cerebrum, which differs in 

 no respect from the reflex or automatic action of the centers below, ex- 

 cept, perhaps, in being more complex in its details. There is a great 

 deal of this semi-conscious action, and there are all grades of it, down 

 to the point where consciousness is lost, and the action purely automatic 

 goes on in unconsciousness. But the stimulations which go to form 

 purposes, and carry out purposive actions, are largely, if not exclu- 

 sively, made up of the recollections of sensations of a positive nature, 

 either agreeable or painful. And the purposes are formed to perpetu- 

 ate or renew those actions productive of the agreeable sensations, or to 

 inhibit those which result in painful and uneasy sensations. 



While there is no difference in principle between reflex and purposive 

 actions, the latter appear to attach themselves to us, and to become our 

 own. This is because the purposive actions get their stimulations from 

 the memories of sensations aroused in us by the external sensory stim- 

 uli. The sensation is a motion of the ether contained in the internal 

 sense cells, and it accompanies the first differentiation of these cells, 

 and the re-erection of them, which constitutes recollection. It is there- 

 fore an indication of a permanent alteration made in our brain tissues, 

 and this alteration is the only sort of stimulation that produces the ef- 

 fect of sensation in us. This, then, is no doubt the reason why actions 

 stimulated by sensations ( that is, purposive actions ) appear in subse- 

 quent sensations (or consciousness) as peculiarly our own, while the re- 

 flex, instinctive and automatic actions of the lower centers, do not. 

 These latter we speak of as being performed mechanically, involuntarily, 

 instinctively, &c. , while the former are said to be done intelligently, 

 voluntarily, consciously, &c. We have small feeling of responsibility 

 for the involuntary actions, because there is a sort of ill-defined, but 

 correct, sense of these actions being done through us, rather than by us. 



