Conscience, and the Moral Sense. 719 



But there is a subjective sense of responsibility for our voluntary ac- 

 tions. Responsibility to what ? Obviously to new sensations ; that is, 

 to consciousness. Nothing else does, or by any possibility can, concern 

 us. Prediction is recollection referred to the future. Every purpose 

 terminates with a prediction. In every case the prediction is of action 

 of such a character as must be productive of pleasurable sensations. A 

 purpose devoid of such a prediction is not possible in the nature of 

 things. The purpose is constructed with reference to the prediction as 

 its guiding sensation, the sensation of a present inharmony in the rela- 

 tions of organs constituting the wish or motive of the purpose. The 

 feeling of responsibility arises as a sensation of a possible inadequacy 

 of the purpose and its action to produce the predicted sensation. Such 

 a feeling arises, if, after a purpose is formed, and perhaps during its 

 execution, a hasty comparison of the present with some former action 

 takes place in whole or in part, by which new elements of an inharmoni- 

 ous kind are developed to affect and weaken the prediction, which then 

 becomes less firm and confident. When, on the other hand, the predic- 

 tion is strengthened, we cheerfully say we assume the responsibility, 

 feeling, however, so confident of the satisfactory natuie of the sensa- 

 tion to result, that its burden is light. The principle is the same in all 

 cases, regardless of details, which may be very complicated and far 

 reaching. If a hunter attack a grizzly bear, his prediction and sense 

 of responsibility will not end with his shot at the animal, but will in- 

 clude the action of the bear, and his own sensations after the bear gets 

 through with him. But no matter how far the action gets away, it must 

 at last come back to one's own personality, and (in his prediction) pro- 

 duce in him an effect in sensation, or else no feeling of responsibility 

 goes with it. Thus, a purpose originating in an uneasy sensation, has 

 an agreeable sensation for its end. 



The conclusion that agreeable sensations constitute the only end and 

 motive of voluntary action in man or beast, accords with the universal 

 instinct of man. In all intercourse with each other and in all concep- 

 tions of other intelligent beings, as Gods, Angels and Devils, this notion 

 appears as a settled though not always well defined conviction. ( See 

 Heb. 11 : 26 and 12 :2 ; Is. 43 : 7.) In striving to influence men we 

 know of no other motive to appeal to. Our pulpits, schools, laws, 

 punishments, rewards, advice, admonition, instruction everything by 

 which we expect to move or influence others and make them moral, ap- 

 pcnl to this motive. 



It might be anticipated then that here will be found the basis and 

 constructive energy underlying Conscience and the Moral Sense. 



In a very early condition of the human race every man thought he 

 saw his interest in the plunder and at times even in the murder of any 



