932 Dynamic Theory. 



relate to only a part of our personalit}-. To our consciousness, there- 

 fore, our personality does not appear precisely the same for an} T two 

 consecutive periods of time. We see ourselves piece-meal, and as at- 

 tention wakes up first one memory and then another, we experience the 

 sensations they are qualified to give, some pleasurable, some painful, 

 and some indifferent. We thus appear to ourselves through our feelings, 

 and to others through the expressions of them, different at different 

 times, in accordance with the sort of memories that are active. The 

 sum of our feelings at any one moment constitutes all there is of our 

 conscious ego at that moment, but they usually include a sub-conscious- 

 ness of other memories not active, which contain elements competent to 

 reconstruct the conscious ego and make it feel like another one. As 

 these other memories become active, and their recollections attach 

 themselves to the already active consciousness, the successive states of 

 the ego are linked together, giving a feeling of continuity, and binding 

 all into a single one. These different sensations and recollections con- 

 sidered together constitute the total conscious personality. This is con- 

 stantly being added to as we accumulate additional ideas, and it like- 

 wise suffers constant loss and decay through forgetfulness. A person 

 living to old age has usually forgotten much more than he can remem- 

 ber, and the sensations which it is possible for him to recover, are but 

 a small part of those he has had. He has died piece-meal, and at the 

 last there is not much of him left to die. The feeling of identity which 

 dhe has, that is, the conviction that he is the same person to whom such 

 and such things happened yesterday, last week and last year, depends 

 upon his ability to connect his present sensations with the memory of 

 those past events. When these memories are totally obliterated, he is 

 no longer able to identify himself as having been concerned with such 

 events, and his conscious personality has suffered death to that extent. 

 But the obliteration of memory will not take place as long as the 

 brain cells, which were impressed with the original sensations, remain 

 healthy and intact. But as soon as a part of the brain is destroyed or 

 atrophied by disease, the memories which were registered in it are lost, 

 and the subject no longer identifies the facts to which the memories re- 

 lated, as belonging to his personality. . A hole has been made in his 

 conscious personality, and the part that is gone can never be recovered. 

 Such destruction of brain tissue will entail loss of the feeling of conti 

 nuity and identity, by which the memories belonging to it had been at- 

 tached to the rest of the personality. And such loss by disturbing the 

 balance of tension, and the mutual restraints which the different organs 

 exercise upon each other, leads to abnormal and deranged action among 

 the organs that are related to those destroyed, though not actually shar- 

 ing in their destruction. The sort of consciousness resulting from such 



