The Mind. 987 



merous phenomena of unconscious brain action pointed out in chapter 

 75, make it extremely easy for any one to conclude that consciousness 

 is a sort of ornamental function, nice on some accounts, but productive 

 of such a frightful lot of misery as to render it an even thing whether 

 we should not be better off without it, especially since as a business 

 function it appeared to cut little or no figure. But the fact is, as has 

 been pointed out, consciousness is a business function of the highest 

 order. I believe that all our actions, except those exclusively reflex, are 

 dictated by " states of consciousness," or as I prefer to express it, sen- 

 sations. Even in somnambulism the subject is careful to avoid danger, 

 and he must do it from the force of habit established while he was 

 awake to sensation. But our waking actions are manifestly dictated 

 with reference to their probable effects on us in painful or pleasurable 

 sensations. (See page 771. ) What is it that induces a child to handle 

 a pretty coal of fire just once, and ever afterward induces him not to? 

 What is it that enables the majority of people to resist the fascinating 

 impulse to caress a buzz-saw? 



Where Prof. Huxley sa} r s that the "feeling we call volition is not the 

 cause of the voluntary act," he is right, but unfortunately this is not 

 an " extreme illustration." It accords with what is said (pp 760-763) 

 in regard to the distinction between the will and the sensation of it 

 which supervenes after it is formed. But we are to remember that the 

 will is on the motor side of brain action, or at any rate on the boundary 

 line, and is a part of the mental action inaugurated by the mind. The 

 sensations which run it are on the other, the afferent, or mind forming 

 side, and this feeling of a volition formed, does not get around to that 

 side until after that will has been formed and perhaps executed. Of 

 course it takes no part in the formation of that will, but becoming in- 

 corporated immediately with the other sensations which go toward the 

 formation of mind, it may have an influence in subsequent formations 

 of the will. Thus clearly we must distinguish between the sensations 

 which precede and form a will, and the sensation which succeeds and 

 informs us that such a will has been formed. If in walking you cast 

 your eyes down, they may watch the motions of your feet without inter- 

 fering, the sensations they convey being those of a spectator and subse- 

 quent to the fact; but if you see an obstruction, that sensation is ante- 

 cedent to a will which causes the feet to move so as to avoid it. 



We will now examine some passages in the lecture on "Sensation," 

 before alluded to. Prof. Huxley calls attention to the obvious truth 

 that the terms we apply to smell, such as musky, fishy, balmy, &c. , re- 

 late to our sensations and not to the odorous body. Muskiness denotes 

 nothing but sensation, is a mental state and has no existence except as 

 a mental phenomenon; and it is as absurd to suppose it resides in a plant 



