The Mind. 991 



edge would be limited to that of a shifting succession of immaterial 

 phenomena. But if an immaterial substance may exist it may have any 

 conceivable properties, and sensation may be one of them." 



I agree that the sense organ, the nerve, and the sensorium, and the 

 changes that take place in them, are 'to be described in terms of matter 

 and motion of matter, and that these changes are continuous with and 

 in principle similar to those which take place in the external world. It 

 is doubtless true too, that ' ' with the sensorium matter and motion come 

 to an end " so far as psychical phenomena are concerned. But it is by 

 no means to be admitted that this ending of the motion that constitutes 

 the function of the sensorium, is succeeded by the appearance of c ' phen- 

 omena of another order or immaterial states of consciousness." When 

 the motion of the sensorium has ceased, the " state of consciousness" 

 has ceased. It is true that the state of consciousness is immaterial be- 

 cause that term, " state of consciousness," describes the motion of the 

 sensorium, and that is immaterial indeed, though neither more nor less 

 so than the motion of a falling stone, or of a ticking watch, or of a 

 waving flag, or of a ringing bell, or a pulsating atmosphere, or of a 

 beam of solar radiation. All motion is immaterial. The motion of matter 

 is just exactly as immaterial as the motion of any conceivable or in- 

 conceivable immaterial substance. So we are not called upon to answer 

 the question ' ' How is the relation between the material and the imma- 

 terial phenomena to be conceived? " I take it, all phenomena are to be 

 described in terms of motion and that therefore there are no material 

 phenomena. If, however, by the expression " immaterial phenomena " 

 be meant the phenomena of an immaterial substance or existence, then 

 the question arises, has the existence of any such substance been proved, 

 or if it is merely hypothetical, does such hypothesis in any way help the 

 solution of the problem of consciousness. 



Consider the first of the three h}*pothesis mentioned above; viz., that 

 there is an immaterial substance which is set in motion by that motion 

 of material substances which ends in the sensorium. That is to sa} r , a 

 motion of matter beginning in the environment continues to be a mo- 

 tion of matter in some form or other through the sense organ, the 

 nerve, and the sensorial cell, then it ceases as the motion of matter, and 

 is continued as the motion of a substance or existence, or entity which 

 is not matter; and this motion, or the way in which this substance is 

 affected, as Prof. Huxley has stated it, ' ' gives rise to the sensation. " 

 Now if the ' ' affection " or motion, and I cannot conceive of any sort 

 of affection which is to be described in any other way than in terms of 

 motion, if this motion of the immaterial substance is not itself sensa- 

 tion, but merely " gives rise" to it, then we are left to imagine another 

 remove still, and something else be}^ond this first instalment of imma- 



