992 Dynamic Theory. 



terial substance. But if we ever do get there we are bound to find sen- 

 sation to be a motion of something, and unless we are willing to throw 

 over the well ascertained law of the conservation of energy to accommo- 

 date an hypothesis, we shall have to admit it to be the continuation and 

 dynamic equivalent of a motion of matter. And if this is the case we 

 are under the further necessity of recognizing the phenomenon as still 

 being within the domain of physics, regardless of the designation ' ' im- 

 material " or any other name we ma} 7 " choose to give it. 



It is true we talk of " states of conciousness, " but we must not mis- 

 lead ourselves by such language to imagine this is a permanent condi- 

 tion of rest, into which we can get ourselves, and in which we remain 

 motionless for an indefinite time. When we are conscious we are con- 

 scious of some definite thing. Consciousness of a definite thing is a 

 sensation, and vice versa. A sensation relating to anything endures 

 only so long as force or energy is reflected from that thing, or its repre- 

 sentative in our internal sense organs, upon the sensorial cells. The 

 moment that motion stops, sensation stops. I think it is not necessary 

 to repeat the proofs of this given elsewhere, but assuming it proved 

 that sensation is motion, the inquiry narrows down to the question, how 

 the motion can be transferred from the material substance of the sensor- 

 ium, to the hypothetical immaterial substance, the motion of which is as- 

 sumed to constitute sensation? Can we suppose that the impact of a 

 material substance against an immaterial one can communicate motion to 

 the latter? Can we conceive of such an impact at all? The only con- 

 dition on which we may conceive it possible, is that the immaterial body 

 being at rest, offers resistance to the impact of the material body, and 

 receives motion from it equivalent in its kinetic energy, to that which 

 has been lost by the material body. If there has been no resistance, 

 there can be no loss of energy on the part of the material body and 

 therefore no transfer of motion, and no sensation at all would be the 

 result. If we find resistance as a property of this hypothetical imma- 

 terial substance we shall be compelled to denounce it as masquerading 

 under a false title, for resistance is a property of matter. But if the 

 difficulty in conceving how motion can be transferred from the material 

 to the immaterial substance be supposed somehow to be obviated, we im- 

 mediately encounter another and similar trouble in accounting for the 

 whereabouts and disposition of the energy after it ceases to be sensa- 

 tion, for we know it soon does so cease. 



On the theory that the molecular motion of the material belonging to the 

 sensorial cells themselves, constitutes the sensation, this difficult}'- does 

 not occur, for sensation being therefore a form of energy, it is convert- 

 ible into heat, which is another form, but which is simply the molecular 

 motion of matter. But we cannot allow this disposition of it, if we 

 accept the immaterial theoiy. It cannot be dissipated as heat in the 



