Force and Form. 1051 



is effected in the molecules or moles of a bod} T , that instant it becomes 

 to all intents and purposes a new body. But it is not therefore some- 

 thing made from nothing. If two different bodies be consolidated into 

 one, the result is also a new bod}', and the form may be totally differ- 

 ent from that of either of the constituents, and the properties and reac- 

 tions totally changed. A man may tear down a brick house and with 

 the materials construct a bake oven, an arch bridge, or a smoke stack; or 

 he may take some pig iron and melt it and make it into a steam-chest, 

 a cook-stove, or a gas-pipe. Without changing the material, a simple 

 alteration of form makes a radical difference between the functions or 

 reactions possible to the body; and this consideration applied to chem- 

 ical elements leads to the conclusion that since change of form alone is 

 proved to be productive of change in' chemical properties, therefore 

 form alone constitutes the difference between bodies ; and that when re- 

 duced to their simplest forms, viz., atomicules, all bodies are alike; 

 and that therefore before bodies are differentiated from the original 

 ether, all matter is alike. 



The change of reaction and function that supervenes upon a change 

 of form is often of the most radical and extreme nature. The change 

 of form may take place very suddenly and quietly under the impulse of 

 external energy. But still it is surprising that any of these changes 

 however swift and magical, should nowadays mislead any one to intro- 

 duce the supernatural into his notions of their causation. But 

 still they do. Mivart says, ' ' Universal and persistent continuit} T in na- 

 ture does not exist." He gives as examples of "interruptions" the 

 separation of the embryo from the bod} r of the parent, and the impreg- 

 nation of an ovum ' ' wherein there is and must be an instant before and 

 an instant after the contact of the ultimate sexual elements." He 

 holds with Wallace that a "new cause or power" must have "come 

 into action" "at the origin of life and sensitivity as well as at the 

 origin of man himself." He and Mr. Wallace also agree " in affirming 

 the active agency of immaterial principles in bringing about the phe- 

 nomena of nature, organic and inorganic. But if the necessary inter- 

 vention of an intelligent immaterial agency be accepted to account for 

 the origin of any part or power of the material world, why not also for 

 the origin of man? " 



It seems to me the effect of the above view is to introduce the super- 

 natural and miraculous into every chain of causation where any link of 

 such chain may happen to be obscure to our apprehension. For if this 

 notion is admitted anywhere it must be even-where. If every apparent 

 "interruption" in the continuity of causation like the above, is to be 

 bridged over by a supernatural intelligence, it must officiate at the birth 

 of every individual, because the distinction of race is got only by the 



